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Michael H. Payne

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As Chair of the firm’s growing Government Contracting Group, Michael represents contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers on a wide range of federal contracting issues, including the interpretation of solicitation and contract provisions, the filing of bid protests, resolution of disputes, and the preparation of contract claims and the litigation of appeals. Michael has vast experience in federal government contracting, stemming from his time as Chief Trial Attorney for the North Atlantic Division of the Army Corps of Engineers, and is recognized in the federal construction contracting industry as an attorney who enjoys a good working relationship with government agencies.

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In a decision issued on April 21, 2008,  Bell BCI Company v, United States, the United States Court of Federal Claims issued a decision that can only be described as a “slam dunk” for the contractor. The case arose from the construction of a laboratory building at the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) in Bethesda, Maryland.  Approximately nine months into construction, NIH decided to add a new floor to the building. NIH issued more than 200 contract modifications that delayed the completion of the project by 19-1/2 months, and increased the contract price by $21.4 million, or 34 percent.  The prime contractor, Bell BCI Company (“Bell”), received payment for performing most of the changed work, but asserted an impact claim for the cumulative effect of the changes on Bell’s overall performance.  The decision includes a number of conclusions of law that will be very interesting to contractors who face unwarranted denials of cumulative impact claims, or the unfair application of leverage by the Government. The description below is based upon excerpts from the decision, but a reading of the entire decision is strongly recommended.

The Court found in favor of the contractor, and awarded damages of $6,200,672, the full amount of its claim, plus Contract Disputes Act interest measured from April 5, 2002. The record demonstrated that NIH, despite its best intentions, lost control of the project beginning in September 2000, and could not prevent the scientists who would occupy the building from demanding changes. The addition of a new floor after construction had begun proved to be a disastrous idea, particularly in causing many mechanical and electrical changes after the work already had been installed.  As changes and delays mounted, NIH and its quality management firm only made matters worse by directing Bell to perform extra work without time extensions, or authorizing Bell to accelerate performance. In issuing 200-plus contract modifications, NIH actually addressed more than 730 Extra Work Orders (“EWOs”).

The Court found that there was evidence that NIH failed to satisfy its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the administration of the project. NIH asserted a liquidated damages claim against Bell knowing that such a claim lacked a factual basis. NIH lodged this claim only to gain negotiating leverage after Bell submitted a request for equitable adjustment.  Further, NIH’s quality construction manager recanted the Contracting Officer’s approval of various extra work items after Bell had completed the extra work.  The Court noted “a contracting officer’s review of certified claims submitted in good faith is not intended to be a negotiating game where the agency may deny meritorious claims to gain leverage over the contractor.” Moreland Corp. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 268, 292 (2007). The same principle applies where the agency asserts an unfounded liquidated damages claim solely to gain negotiating leverage.

The Court stated that Bell’s claim for damages from delay and cumulative impact on the NIH project sometimes is called a “delay and disruption” claim. There is a distinction in the law between: (1) a “delay” claim; and (2) a “disruption” or “cumulative impact” claim. Although the two claim types often arise together in the same project, a “delay” claim captures the time and cost of not being able to work, while a “disruption” claim captures the cost of working less efficiently than planned. Bell BCI Co. v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 164, 168 (2006); see also U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Blake Constr. Co., Inc., 671 F.2d 539, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that, unlike a delay claim that provides redress from not being able to work, a disruption claim compensates for damages when the work is more difficult and expensive than anticipated).

The contractor must prove for either claim the elements of liability, causation, and resultant injury. When the contractor is asserting a delay claim, the contractor has the burden of showing the extent of the delay, that the delay was proximately caused by government action, and that the delay caused damage to the contractor. While the law requires “reasonable certainty” to support a damages award, damages do not need to proven with mathematical exactness. Rather, “[i]t is sufficient if a claimant furnishes the court with a reasonable basis for computation, even though the result is only approximate.”  Ace Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 253, 274 (2006) Continue Reading Cumulative Impact Claim Allowed by the United States Court of Federal Claims

The requirement found at FAR 52.203-13 was implemented on December 24, 2007 and requires any contractor who is awarded a contract in excess of $5 million to have a written Code of Business Ethics and Conduct within thirty days after award.  Large business firms must also implement a training and compliance program within ninety days…

An important decision, Serco, Inc. v. United States was issued by the United States Court of Claims last week in a case involving a government-wide acquisition contract (“GWAC”) awarded by the General Services Administration (GSA) to provide technology products and services to the entire federal government.  Sixty-two offerors competed for a chance to perform task orders under this GWAC.  In ranking the technical proposals of these offerors, GSA teams assigned adjectival ratings to various subfactors and then converted them into whole numbers ( e.g., 3, 4, 5). Combining, averaging and weighting these figures, the agency ended up with technical scores that were carried out to three decimal points ( e.g., 3.817), and it made critical distinctions among the sixty-two offerors based upon the thousandths of a point.  Based upon these technical scores, twenty-eight contractors were designated by the agency as “presumptive awardees.”  GSA then purported to conduct price reasonableness and tradeoff analyses to take into account price-but, conspicuously, none of these comparisons resulted in any of the “presumptive awardees” being displaced by a lower-priced offeror.  Indeed, GSA ultimately made awards to offerors whose prices were 59th, 60th and 61st out of the sixty-two offers-prices that the agency claims were “fair and reasonable” despite being twice as high as the lowest winning offer, as much as thirty percent higher than the independent government cost estimate, and more than two standard deviations to the mean of the evaluated prices for all the offerors.

The so-called “Alliant” GWAC is to be administered by GSA pursuant to section 5112(e) of the Clinger-Cohen Act.  Alliant is designed to provide federal agencies with a broad range of information technology (IT) products and services, including computers, ancillary equipment, software, firmware and similar applications, network design, support services, and related resources such as telecommunication and security.  Alliant contemplates the multiple-award of indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (MA/IDIQ) contracts, with a ceiling of $50 billion, to be performed, on a task order basis, during a five-year base period and one, five-year option period.  Under the Alliant Solicitation No. TQ2006MCB0001 (the Solicitation), individual task orders could range as high as $1 billion in value; successful offerors, however, are guaranteed a minimum take of only $2,500.  Alliant offers a wide range of contract types, including fixed-price, cost reimbursement, labor-hour and time and material.

On September 26, 2007, Serco, Inc. (Serco) filed a complaint in this court challenging the award decisions and seeking a variety of injunctive relief.  Subsequently eight other unsuccessful offerors filed protests and were joined in the Serco protest. GSA issued the Solicitation on September 29, 2006. The Solicitation advised that GSA “contemplate[d making] approximately 25 to 30 awards … but reserves the right to place fewer or more awards, depending upon the quality of the proposals received.” Those receiving awards under the Solicitation are eligible to perform task orders under the contract. The Solicitation indicated that “[a]ward will be made to responsible Offerors whose proposals are determined to provide the ‘best value’ to the Government.”

In a scholarly opinion, by Judge Francis M. Allegra, the Court concluded that GSA, “in attaching ”talismanic significance to technical calculations that suffer from false precision, made distinctions that, in their own right, likely were arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law, but certainly became so when the agency failed adequately to account for price and to make appropriate tradeoff decisions. Those compounding errors prejudiced the plaintiffs and oblige this court to set aside the awards in question and order appropriate injunctive relief.”  The Court did not agree that there was a rational basis to make distinctions between offerors on the basis of thousandths of a point. Judge Allegra ruled that “Precision of thought is not always reflected in the number of digits found to the right of a decimal point – indeed, as with other constructs, there can be, to paraphrase Holmes, a “kind of precision that obscures.”  Ultimately, Court ruled that the agency made award decisions that were “arbitrary, capricious and otherwise contrary to law.”Continue Reading Court Enjoins Awards of Government-wide Task Order Contracts Because of "False Precision" in the Numerical Ratings of the Offerors

A decision has been issued in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, by Judge Stanwood R. Duval, Jr., dismissing the consolidated class action lawsuit against the United States Army Corps of Engineers for the failure of the Orleans Parish outfall canals and, in particular, the 17th Street Canal that…

We published an article on March 5, 2007, reporting a proposed amendment to the FAR that would require government contractors to prepare a Code of Business Ethics and Conduct.  On November 23, 2007, a final rule was published in the Federal Register and two new FAR clauses became effective on December 24, 2007. These new clauses are very important to all federal government contractors and they mandate the preparation of a Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct (FAR 52.203-13) and the Display of Hotline Poster(s) (FAR 52.203-14) if a contractor receives an award in excess of $5 million with a period of performance of at least 120 days.  This is yet another example of the unending criminalization of the federal procurement process that makes it very risky for any contractor to do business with the federal government unless the contractor keeps up-to-date on the rules.  It is anticipated that suspension and debarment will be among the potential consequences of a failure to comply with these new rules, and a contractor’s record of integrity and business ethics may now become part of the contractor’s performance record that is evaluated as part of the contract award process.

FAR 9.104-1(d) provides that contractors must have “a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics.” In furtherance of that requirement, the new policy explained in FAR 3.10, provides that “Government contractors must conduct themselves with the highest degree of integrity and honesty” and that “Contractors should have a written code of business ethics and conduct.”  To promote compliance with the code of business ethics and conduct, contractors should have an employee business ethics and compliance training program and an internal control system that—

(1) Are suitable to the size of the company and extent of its involvement in Government contracting;

(2) Facilitate timely discovery and disclosure of improper conduct in connection with Government contracts; and

(3) Ensure corrective measures are promptly instituted and carried out. (See FAR 3.1002).

Specifically, the bew FAR requirements for the code of business ethics and conduct require that it be:

1. in writing;

2. issued within 30 days of the contract award (unless the contracting officer allows a longer time period);

3. furnished to each employee engaged in performance of the contract; and

4. that the contractor "promote" compliance with its code of business ethics and conduct.

Although the policy expressed in FAR 3.1002 applies as guidance to all government contractors, the mandatory requirements are explained in the new clauses found at FAR 52.203-13 and FAR 52.203-14.  All contractors receiving awards in excess of $5 million where the period of performance is 120 days or more must have a code of business ethics and conduct, but the requirements for a training program, awareness and compliance program, and internal controls, do not apply to small business concerns.  All contractors who expect to receive awards, or subcontracts, in excess of $5 million, with periods of performance of 120 days, would be well advised to consult with legal counsel to obtain advice as to what must be done to comply.  There is nothing to be gained by waiting for a contract to be awarded, given the thirty day time period to prepare the code of business ethics and conduct (unless extended by the contracting officer), and the document should be prepared and distributed as soon as possible.

It is important to understand that these new rules are being implemented because the Federal Government has found that voluntary disclosure has not worked and has concluded that mandatory requirements are needed.  We will be advising our clients to provide ethics training, even if they are small business concerns, to make it clear that they take these new requirements seriously.  If a company principal or an employee commits a criminal act in the performance of a government contract, the company will be viewed in a more favorable light if it demonstrates that it has already implemented the requirements of the new regulation.  Just as it does little good to repair a cracked sidewalk after someone has tripped and broken a leg, it does little good to implement ethics requirements and training after a violation has occurred.

A summary of the mandatory requirements are as follows:

A contractor must have a written code of business ethics and conduct in place within thirty days of the award of any contract in excess of $5 million.  The time may be extended by the contacting officer and the requirement does not apply to existing contracts that were awarded before December 24, 2007, or to task orders awarded under those contracts.

A copy of the code of business ethics and conduct must be furnished to each employee involved in the performance of the contract. In addition, the contractor is required to promote compliance with its code.

Unless the company is a small business concern, and has so certified in the bid or offer submitted in response to the solicitation, the contractor must establish an ongoing business ethics and business conduct awareness program, and an internal control system, within ninety days after award of the contract.  This time period may also be extended by the contracting officer.

The internal control system is intended to facilitate timely discovery of improper conduct in connection with Government contracts, and to ensure that corrective measures are promptly instituted and carried out.  Although the regulation is not very explicit about the structure of the required internal control system, examples of what is required include (1) Periodic reviews of company business practices, procedures, policies, and internal controls for compliance with the Contractor’s code of business ethics and conduct and the special requirements of Government contracting; (2) An internal reporting mechanism, such as a hotline, by which employees may report suspected instances of improper conduct, and instructions that encourage employees to make such reports; (3) Internal and/or external audits, as appropriate; and (4) Disciplinary action for improper conduct.

The contractor is required to include the substance of the clause found at FAR 52-203-13 in subcontracts that have a value in excess of $5 million and a performance period of more than 120 days, unless the subcontract is for a commercial item or is for work entirely performed outside of the United States. (
Author’s Note: Contractors should be aware that a “purchase order” qualifies as a “subcontract” for purposes of this clause, subject the exceptions noted in the preceding sentence).

The second clause, found at FAR 52.203-14, requires the Contractor to prominently display hotline posters in common work areas within business segments performing work under this contract and at contract work sites, (i) any agency fraud hotline poster or Department of Homeland Security (DHS) fraud hotline poster identified in paragraph (b)(3) of this clause; and (ii) any DHS fraud hotline poster subsequently identified by the Contracting Officer. In addition, if the Contractor maintains a company website as a method of providing information to employees, the Contractor is required display an electronic version of the poster(s) at the website. As in the case of FAR 52.203-13 discussed above, the substance of this clause must be included in subcontracts that have a value in excess of $5 million and a performance period of more than 120 days, unless the subcontract is for a commercial item or is for work entirely performed outside of the United States. (Author’s Note: If the Contractor has implemented a business ethics and conduct awareness program, including a reporting mechanism, such as a hotline, then the Contractor need not display any agency fraud hotline posters as required in paragraph (b) of this clause, other than any required DHS posters).

A supplement to the new requirement for a Code of Business Ethics and Conduct is also under consideration at the request of the Department of Justice. The proposed additional rule was published on November 14, 2007 and comments must be submitted by January 14, 2008. This Proposed Rule imposes additional requirements regarding codes of business ethics and conduct, including notification requirements for contractors upon becoming aware of violations of federal law.  The following additional requirements will be imposed on those contractors subject to the requirements of FAR 3.10, as implemented by FAR 52.203-13 and FAR 52-203-14, if the proposed rule becomes effective:Continue Reading Contractors Now Required to Prepare a Code of Business Ethics and Conduct and to Implement Internal Controls and Ethics Training

A protest was filed recently in the United Stated Court of Federal Claims by our firm on behalf of a small business construction contractor challenging a solicitation issued by the Fort Worth District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The solicitation, No. W9126G-07-R-0123, is one of four similar solicitations for the construction of military projects…

In a case captioned as Ace Constructors, Inc. v. United States concerning a contract with the Corps of Engineers for the construction of a structure at Biggs Army Airfield, the Federal Circuit upheld a Court of Federal Claims ruling awarding an equitable adjustment to ACE Constructors (“ACE”) and the return of liquidated delay damages.  The Court had ruled that, due to unforeseen conditions and defective specifications that were incorporated into the contract, ACE was entitled to additional relief beyond that which was provided by the contracting officer.  In particular, the Court awarded ACE its additional costs for: 1) being required to use a more expensive concrete testing methodology than was required by the contract; 2) being required to use a more expensive method of concrete paving than was required by the contract; and, 3) a Type I differing site condition that required 129,000 additional cubic yards of fill dirt.

On appeal, the government argued that the award for concrete testing was erroneous because: 1) ACE had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and, therefore, the Court did not have jurisdiction over the claim; 2) the contract required the more expensive testing method; and 3) ACE did not demonstrate that its bid was based on the less expensive method of testing.  The Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal claims had jurisdiction because the claim presented to the contracting officer and the claim before the Court did not differ significantly.  The Circuit Court also upheld the lower court’s ruling that the specifications were defective and that ACE reasonably concluded that the more expensive testing was not required by the contract (a fact which the government had acknowledged during the course of performance of the contract).  Finally, the Circuit Court upheld the lower court’s ruling that ACE reasonably based its bid on the less expensive method of testing. Regarding the method of concrete paving required by the contract, the government again argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim and additionally argued that ACE unreasonably relied on the defective contract specification when it calculated its bid based on the less expensive method of paving.  The Federal Circuit again found that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over the claim and upheld the Court’s ruling that when the government provides a contractor with defective specifications, it is deemed to have breached the implied warranty that satisfactory contract performance will result from adherence to the specifications. ACE’s reliance on the specifications was reasonable. Continue Reading Federal Appeals Court Upholds Ruling that Contractor was Entitled to Damages Resulting from Defective Specifications and Differing Site Conditions

The Corps of Engineers responded to the recent Order of the United States Court of Federal Claims dated November 1, 2007, granting a permanent injunction against the issuance of a MATOC solicitation for dredging, by taking four proposed task orders included in the MATOC solicitation and reissuing them as separate negotiated procurements.  (See …

In a recent prebid protest presented by our firm, Payne Hackenbracht & Sullivan, the United States Court of Federal Claims considered the protest of Weeks Marine, Inc. v. The United States (“Weeks”) challenging the decision of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, South Atlantic Division (“SAD”), to solicit proposals for maintenance dredging and shore protection projects using negotiated indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (“IDIQ”) multiple-award task order contracts (“MATOC”).  The Court noted that the contemplated change to negotiated IDIQ task order contracting represented a significant departure from SAD’s prior practice of using sealed bidding, and further noted that the policy change had caused widespread industry criticism. 

As grounds for its protest, Weeks asserted that SAD’s proposed change to negotiated IDIQ/MATOC task order contracting was contrary to law, and was without any rational basis.  Weeks relied upon 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) and Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) ¶ 6.401(a), mandating that an agency shall use sealed bidding procedures when (1) time permits, (2) awards will be made solely based on price, (3) discussions are not necessary, and (4) the agency reasonably expects to receive more than one bid. Weeks contended that each of these four conditions was met for SAD’s dredging contracts, and that no legal basis existed to use negotiation procedures.

The Corps of Engineers argued in opposition that SAD’s proposed IDIQ task order contracting was lawful, that the agency had wide discretion in selecting an appropriate procurement method, and that SAD’s justification for the change was reasonable under current circumstances.  The Court disagreed and ruled that an agency’s discretion “does not empower an agency to employ a procurement method in violation of applicable law.”  The Court ruled that SAD had not pointed to any significant changes in its procurement environment that would warrant a change to IDIQ task order contracting.  The Acquisition Plan confirmed that SAD had “excelled in program execution” during the last two years and “the Court does not see any reasons or developments for moving away from the sealed bid process.  Without any analysis of the applicable statutes and regulations, and without citing any significant reasons or developments, the Court held that SAD would violate 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a), FAR ¶ 6.401(a), FAR ¶ 14.103-1(a), and FAR ¶ 36.103(a) by employing IDIQ task order contracting methods.“

This is an important judicial opinion that will hopefully cause government agencies to revisit decisions to utilize contracting by negotiation in either single procurements or IDIQ contracting.  When the sole justification for negotiated contracting boils down to nothing more than a desire to introduce unnecessary subjectivity into the source selection process, RFPs should not be used and sealed bidding should continue to be the preferred method.  In dredging, as in many other areas of construction contracting, sealed bidding has been a successful procurement method for many years.  It is a system that provides the greatest risk coupled with the greatest opportunity for reward and it is an integral part of the free enterprise system.

Of great concern to the Court was the fact that under SAD’s “new” procurement method approximately $2 billion in task order awards during the next five years would become virtually immune from any judicial or administrative bid protest review.  The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (“FASA”) provides that “[a] protest is not authorized in connection with the issuance of a task order or delivery order except for a protest on the ground that the order increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which the order is issued.”  While SAD’s current sealed bid awards routinely are subject to bid protest review by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) or the Court, SAD’s task order awards would be insulated from review except in very limited circumstances.  Thus, while purporting to use highly discretionary “best value” evaluation procedures in awarding task orders, SAD effectively would remove itself from any bid protest oversight.   Although the Corps argued that the Court must apply the FASA provision that Congress created, the Court ruled that this provision did not authorize SAD to convert all of its procurements into task orders.

In asserting a need for a change from sealed bidding to contracting by negotiation, the Corps contradicted its own position by stating that its sealed bid approach had “excelled in program execution” during the last two years.  As a result, the Court concluded that “The agency has provided no evidence that the current system is failing or in need of revision.  In fact, the Court would be hard-pressed to identify any contracts better suited to sealed bid procurement than dredging.  If not appropriate for dredging work, it is difficult to imagine when sealed bidding ought to be used.” (Emphasis added).Continue Reading Federal Court Rules that Negotiated IDIQ/MATOC Contracting Cannot be Used Instead of Sealed Bidding Without a Lawful and Rational Basis