When an agency decides to set aside an acquisition for participation only by small businesses, certain subcontracting limitations apply to the small business awardee. For construction contracts, the small business contractor cannot pay subcontractors more than 85% of the amount they receive from the agency. For service and supply contracts, the small business contractor cannot pay more than 50% of the amount paid to it by the agency to other entities that are not similarly situated. Work performed by similarly situated entities is not considered in determining if the limitation on subcontracting is violated. A similarly situated entity is defined as a small business subcontractor that is a participant of the same small business program as the prime contractor and is small for the NAICS code assigned by the prime contractor to the subcontract.
Tim draws on his background as an acquisition law specialist in the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps to help clients navigate the federal government procurement process. He counsels contractors of all sizes on a wide range of government procurement law matters, including bid protests, contract claims and appeals, formation and administration, and ethics and compliance.
Tim also advises his clients on suspension and debarment matters, Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs), and subcontract negotiations and disputes. He has extensive experience before the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), and the Court of Federal Claims (COFC), as well as various other federal and state courts.
By law, a GAO protest must be filed by an interested party. An interested party is an actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be impacted by the award of a contract or by the failure to award a contract. Before bid opening or the closing date for receipt of proposals, a protestor must be a prospective bidder or offeror with a direct economic interest in the procurement. This generally means that a bidder or offeror has expressed an interest in competing and is capable of performing the type of work that the solicitation requires. After bid opening or the submission of proposals, a protestor must be an actual bidder or offeror with a direct economic interest in the procurement. This generally means a bidder or offeror who would be in line for award if the protest were sustained. A protestor who cannot receive an award if it prevails on the merits of its protest is not an interested party. In some cases, a high-priced bidder might be able to demonstrate that all lower-priced bidders are ineligible for award, thus becoming the next-in-line for award. In a “best value” negotiated procurement, the GAO determines whether a protestor is an interested party by examining the probable result if the protest is successful. This means that an actual offeror, who is not in line for award, is an interested party if it would regain the opportunity to compete if the protest is sustained.
A bid protest must allege a violation of a procurement statute or regulation. Although most protests challenge the award or proposed award of a contract, the GAO will also consider protests involving defective solicitations and other unreasonable agency actions like the cancellation of a solicitation. In certain cases, the GAO will consider protests involving the termination of a contract where the protest alleges that the government’s termination was based upon improprieties associated with the contract award (this is sometimes called a “reverse protest”). Additionally, the GAO will consider protests concerning (1) awards of subcontracts by or for a Federal agency, (2) sales by a Federal agency, or (3) procurement actions by government entities that do not fall within the strict definition of Federal agencies, if the agency or entity involved has agreed in writing to allow the GAO to decide the dispute.
Over the past couple of months, we have had several clients contact us to discuss issues involving Organizational Conflicts of Interest (OCIs). In each case, it seemed like there was some confusion either by the government, the contractor, or both, regarding what amounted to a conflict of interest and how having one could impact contract performance. In most cases, we were able to work with the contracting officer and develop a mitigation plan to avoid, neutralize, or mitigate each OCI successfully. This blog post will cover the basics about OCIs and discuss some ways that contractors can work with the government to mitigate them.
The Judgment Fund was established by Congress in 1956 to alleviate the need for specific legislation following every successful claim against the United States. The purpose behind the Judgment Fund was to eliminate the procedural burdens involved in getting an individual appropriation from Congress, allowing for the prompt payment of judgments and reducing the amount of interest accrued between the time the judgment was awarded and payment was made. Although the Judgment Fund successfully eliminated the need for legislative action in almost every case, and in most cases resulted in prompter payments to successful claimants, it also had the unintended consequence of incentivizing procuring agencies to avoid settling meritorious claims in favor of prolonged litigation. Specifically, an agency could avoid making payment from its own appropriated funds if it refused to settle a case and instead sought a decision from a court, subsequently providing it access to the Judgment Fund which draws money straight from the Treasury. Congress eliminated this problem when it passed the Contracts Disputes Act (CDA) of 1978, which requires agencies to reimburse the Judgment Fund with appropriated funds that are current at the time of the judgment against the agency. Although contracting officers are no longer incentivized to avoid settlement, the source and availability of funds can still impact whether or not they decide to settle a claim because there are differences between how a judgment is funded and how a settlement can be funded. Continue Reading How the Judgment Fund’s Availability Impacts a Contracting Officer’s Decision to Settle a Claim
As I mentioned in a recent post, the Department of Defense (DoD) is using its “other transaction” authority with increased frequency to attract non-traditional defense contractors and to capitalize on the cutting-edge technological advancements found in the commercial marketplace. Other Transaction Agreements (OTAs) are not procurement contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements and, as such, many procurement laws and regulations do not apply, including the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Continue Reading Bid Protests: Are Other Transaction Agreements (OTAs) Really Bulletproof?
Last week, I had the opportunity to participate in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s 12th Annual Intelligence Community Legal Conference to discuss acquisition reform with some of the top government attorneys in the intelligence community. Much to my surprise, the majority of the conversation focused on bid protests and the impact that protests have on federal procurements. During my time as a government attorney defending against bid protests, I gained valuable insight into how the government works to defeat them and what contractors can to do improve their chance of success. Some of these lessons are shared below. Continue Reading Bid Protests: An Insider’s Perspective
If you gave me $17 million on the credit card, I could call Cabela’s tonight and outfit every soldier, sailor, airman and Marine, and I’d get a discount on it for a bulk buy. This is a pistol. The technology’s been around for five centuries, and arguably it’s the least important weapons system in the Department of Defense inventory.
Senior leaders within the Department of Defense (DoD) have grown increasingly frustrated with an acquisition system characterized by ever-increasing costs and significant delays in getting end items to customers. Their frustration has been heard by Congress and has resulted in recent Congressional action. The latest major acquisition reform effort started with the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), with each subsequent NDAA containing various provisions that are meant to modernize and accelerate the antiquated and cumbersome federal acquisition system providing flexibility and allowing for the agile acquisition of next-generation technology. Continue Reading The Future of Acquisition in the Federal Government: Innovation and Rapid Procurement Through Other Transaction Authorities and Other Transaction Agreements