Federal Construction Contracting Lawyer & Attorney : Payne Hackenbracht & Sullivan : Construction Law, Dredging and Claims

Effective May 23, 2008, there will be important changes that pertain to a contractor’s ability to protest task and delivery orders.  These changes are embodied in Section 843 of the 2008 Defense Authorization Act, "Enhanced Competition Requirements for Task and Delivery Order Contracts," and the Congress expects the new provisions to increase competition for task and delivery order contracts.  Most notably, the new law allows a contractor to protest a task order in excess of $10 million to the GAO.  Previously, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (“FASA”) prohibited task order protests, except in very limited circumstances.  In addition, the new law requires that DOD task or delivery order contracts in excess of $100 million be awarded to multiple contractors, with certain exceptions, and the establishment of enhanced competition requirements, such as a requirement for debriefings on task or delivery orders in excess of $5 million under such multiple award contracts.  The GAO is currently revising its bid protest rules to address the newly acquired jurisdiction over task order protests. (The new rules will be posted on this blog as soon as they are issued).

At the April 19, 2007 hearing of the Senate Committee on Armed Services regarding the DOD’s management of costs under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (“LOGCAP”) contract in Iraq, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) asked why ithe Army waited five years to split the contract among multiple contractors, allowing for competition of individual task orders.  The response from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics was: "I don't have a good answer for you."  The provisions of Section 843 ensure that, absent compelling reasons not to, there will be competition in the award of task and delivery orders on future contracts of this type.  As far as we are concerned, however, there is an open question as to whether Multiple Award Task Order Contracts (‘MATOC”) are legally authorized under the Federal Acquisition Regulation for the procurement of construction. A protest raising that issue was filed by our firm and is pending before the United States Court of Federal Claims.

Section 843 of the Defense Authorization Act lifts the ban imposed by the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act on protests to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) of task or delivery orders valued over $10 million.  This provision may be short-lived though: it contains a “sunset” provision and expires three years after it becomes effective. Congress enacted Section 843 in response to the need for enhanced competition requirements, and apparently believed that federal agencies had too little oversight when permitted to issue task order procurements that were not subject to protest.   After the FASA was enacted, federal agencies increasingly employed the indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (“IDIQ”) contracts for expensive projects, purportedly to utilize “streamlining” but, in part, to circumvent the bid protest process.  It will be interesting to see whether the newly enacted right to file bid protests will have a “chilling” effect on agency plans to issue IDIQ contracts in the future.

The exclusive jurisdiction granted to the GAO means that the Court of Federal Claims (CFC) will not adjudicate these protests.  Under the current protest regime, both the GAO and the CFC are authorized to hear bid protests, and we would have preferred for that dual jurisdiction to have continued on task order protests, as well.  An advantage of the current system for contractors is that if they are unhappy with the outcome of a GAO protest, they can obtain de novo review of that same protest at the CFC.  Under Section 843, this second chance will not be available for task or delivery order protests. This has serious implications for contractors because only a small fraction of protests heard by the GAO are sustained.  

Additional means of enhancing competition are also set forth by Section 843. For task or delivery orders in excess of $5 million, the government agency is required to provide a fair opportunity to be considered.  This means that at the very least, the following must be provided to all contractors: 1) a notice of the task or delivery order that includes a clear statement of the agency’s requirements; 2) a reasonable period of time to provide a proposal in response to the notice; 3) disclosure of the significant factors and subfactors, including cost or price, that the agency expects to consider in evaluating such proposals, and their relative importance; 4) in the case of an award that is to be made on a best-value basis, a written statement documenting the basis for the award and the relative importance of quality and price or cost factors; and 5) an opportunity for a post-award debriefing. Unless certain exceptions apply, the current law requires the agency to give all multiple-award IDIQ contract holders a fair opportunity to be considered for each order in excess of $2,500.

Section 843 targets sole source awards.  The new rules establish further requirements for agencies awarding IDIQ contracts valued over $100 million to a single awardee, as opposed to multiple sources. In order for this to happen, the head of the agency must make a written determination that (i) all task orders under the contract are so integrally related that only a single contractor can reasonably perform the work; (ii) the contract provides only for firm, fixed-price task or delivery orders at specified unit prices; (iii) only one source is qualified and capable of performing the work at a reasonable price; or (iv) it is necessary in the public interest to award the contract to a single source.  Additionally, Congress must be notified within 30 days of the determination to award an IDIQ contract to a single source.  These new requirements are similar to those of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 6.3 which justify awarding a contract to a single source.

The most potentially controversial provision of the enhanced competition framework of Section 843 is the authorization of task or delivery order protests. In 2003, the Services Reform Act (SARA) authorized the Acquisition Advisory Panel (the "Panel") to review and recommend any necessary changes to acquisition laws and regulations and government-wide acquisition policies. Included in the Panel’s draft report of 2006, was a similar provision, which was met with opposition from interest groups who feared that an increased number of bid protests would raise costs for federal contracts and impede the procurement process.  The final legislation gives exclusive jurisdiction to the GAO over task or delivery award contract protests, and is likely a compromise between the recommendations of the Panel and the concerns of the interest groups.

Section 843 is silent on some procedural matters regarding task or delivery order protests. For instance, the automatic stay requirement of the Competition in Contracting Act is not mentioned. Under the CICA, the contracting agency is required to stay the award or suspend performance of a protested contract upon the commencement of a timely protest to the GAO. Further questions are raised by the silence of Section 843 regarding time limitations for filing task or delivery order protests at GAO.  It would seem that current rules for protests where debriefings were requested would stand. This means that the deadline for filing a task or delivery order protest will likely be 10 days from the date of the debriefing (five days to obtain the automatic CICA stay) in post-award protests-regardless of when the protester learned the basis of the protest. However, the new GAO rules must be reviewed after they are issued to determine whether there are any new or unusual requirements that affect the filing of task order protests.

Congress’ grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the GAO for task and delivery award protests also precludes agency level protests. This seemingly creates a conflict with current federal acquisition policy, which encourages parties to resolve controversies over procurement at the agency level whenever possible. The NDA, however, does not alter the existing statutory requirement, first implemented in the FASA, that each federal agency appoint a task and delivery order ombudsman to review complaints from contractors claiming they were not afforded a fair opportunity to be considered for task or delivery orders.  

For task orders valued below $10 million, the ombudsman remains the only reviewing authority for disappointed contractors. Under Section 843 task order procurements between $5 million and $10 million are subject to the new procedural requirements but still exempt from GAO’s protest jurisdiction. This implies that contractors can still seek to enforce compliance with the new procedures for procurements in this dollar range by submitting a complaint to the ombudsman.

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A protest was filed recently in the United Stated Court of Federal Claims by our firm on behalf of a small business construction contractor challenging a solicitation issued by the Fort Worth District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The solicitation, No. W9126G-07-R-0123, is one of four similar solicitations for the construction of military projects described as Advanced Individual Training (AIT), Basic Training (BT) Barracks, and Warrior in Transition (WIT) facilities. The construction is being solicited through the use of a negotiated Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (“IDIQ”) procurement on a Single Award Task Order (“SATOC”) basis.  Under the terms of the solicitation a single contractor will be selected to perform task orders, without competition, amounting to as much as $330 million over the next three years in an eight state area. The other three similar solicitations contain similar dollar values and apply to similarly extensive geographic areas.

The protest seeks an injunction to prevent the Corps of Engineers from proceeding with the solicitation because of our contention that it is unduly restrictive of competition; it violates the laws prohibiting “bundling” by unlawfully consolidating smaller projects that would have been suitable for small business prime contracting; and, it illegally employs supplies and services indefinite delivery contracting methods under FAR 16.5 to procure large military complexes. There has been a growing outcry from both the small and large business construction communities in recent months regarding the expanded use by the Department of Defense of Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity solicitations to procure construction, seemingly ignoring the fact that indefinite delivery contracts are typically used to acquire supplies and services on a much smaller scale. It is our opinion that Single Award Task Order Contracts and Multiple Award Task Order Contracts are illegally limiting competition and that they may not be appropriately applied to the procurement of major construction projects. 

It is also disturbing that the amount of construction work that is available for sealed bidding is declining to the point that many construction contractors are being closed out of the federal market. (See our earlier article).  The use of sealed bidding provides the greatest opportunity for competition and ultimately results in the lowest prices to the government. This was confirmed by a recent decision of the Court of Federal Claims that held that sealed bidding was the preferred method for the procurement of maintenance dredging and shore protection work.

Although we cannot predict the outcome of the pending protest, we believe that it is important for the Court to review whether there is legal and rational basis for the use of the IDIQ format to procure major construction. The Corps of Engineers has indefinitely postponed the date for receipt of proposals while this matter is under consideration.

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In a recent prebid protest presented by our firm, Payne Hackenbracht & Sullivan, the United States Court of Federal Claims considered the protest of Weeks Marine, Inc. v. The United States (“Weeks”) challenging the decision of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, South Atlantic Division (“SAD”), to solicit proposals for maintenance dredging and shore protection projects using negotiated indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (“IDIQ”) multiple-award task order contracts (“MATOC”).  The Court noted that the contemplated change to negotiated IDIQ task order contracting represented a significant departure from SAD’s prior practice of using sealed bidding, and further noted that the policy change had caused widespread industry criticism. 

As grounds for its protest, Weeks asserted that SAD’s proposed change to negotiated IDIQ/MATOC task order contracting was contrary to law, and was without any rational basis.  Weeks relied upon 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) and Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) ¶ 6.401(a), mandating that an agency shall use sealed bidding procedures when (1) time permits, (2) awards will be made solely based on price, (3) discussions are not necessary, and (4) the agency reasonably expects to receive more than one bid. Weeks contended that each of these four conditions was met for SAD’s dredging contracts, and that no legal basis existed to use negotiation procedures.

The Corps of Engineers argued in opposition that SAD’s proposed IDIQ task order contracting was lawful, that the agency had wide discretion in selecting an appropriate procurement method, and that SAD’s justification for the change was reasonable under current circumstances.  The Court disagreed and ruled that an agency’s discretion “does not empower an agency to employ a procurement method in violation of applicable law.”  The Court ruled that SAD had not pointed to any significant changes in its procurement environment that would warrant a change to IDIQ task order contracting.  The Acquisition Plan confirmed that SAD had “excelled in program execution” during the last two years and “the Court does not see any reasons or developments for moving away from the sealed bid process.  Without any analysis of the applicable statutes and regulations, and without citing any significant reasons or developments, the Court held that SAD would violate 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a), FAR ¶ 6.401(a), FAR ¶ 14.103-1(a), and FAR ¶ 36.103(a) by employing IDIQ task order contracting methods.“

This is an important judicial opinion that will hopefully cause government agencies to revisit decisions to utilize contracting by negotiation in either single procurements or IDIQ contracting.  When the sole justification for negotiated contracting boils down to nothing more than a desire to introduce unnecessary subjectivity into the source selection process, RFPs should not be used and sealed bidding should continue to be the preferred method.  In dredging, as in many other areas of construction contracting, sealed bidding has been a successful procurement method for many years.  It is a system that provides the greatest risk coupled with the greatest opportunity for reward and it is an integral part of the free enterprise system.

Of great concern to the Court was the fact that under SAD’s “new” procurement method approximately $2 billion in task order awards during the next five years would become virtually immune from any judicial or administrative bid protest review.  The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (“FASA”) provides that “[a] protest is not authorized in connection with the issuance of a task order or delivery order except for a protest on the ground that the order increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which the order is issued.”  While SAD’s current sealed bid awards routinely are subject to bid protest review by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) or the Court, SAD’s task order awards would be insulated from review except in very limited circumstances.  Thus, while purporting to use highly discretionary “best value” evaluation procedures in awarding task orders, SAD effectively would remove itself from any bid protest oversight.   Although the Corps argued that the Court must apply the FASA provision that Congress created, the Court ruled that this provision did not authorize SAD to convert all of its procurements into task orders.

In asserting a need for a change from sealed bidding to contracting by negotiation, the Corps contradicted its own position by stating that its sealed bid approach had “excelled in program execution” during the last two years.  As a result, the Court concluded that “The agency has provided no evidence that the current system is failing or in need of revision.  In fact, the Court would be hard-pressed to identify any contracts better suited to sealed bid procurement than dredging.  If not appropriate for dredging work, it is difficult to imagine when sealed bidding ought to be used.” (Emphasis added).

After carefully considering the Administrative Record and the parties’ arguments, the Court found that the solicitation violated applicable statutes and regulations, and that SAD’s attempted justification for the new procurement approach was without a rational basis. The Court also found that the agency’s stated desire to consider evaluation factors other than price, in the dredging industry, “is a weak justification to abandon sealed bidding.”  The Court also noted that “The dredging industry consists of a small group of highly specialized contractors who are well known to SAD and some of the dredging contractors are family-owned companies with small management organizations.  The major barrier to entry is the expensive excavating equipment that a contractor must acquire. Much of the dredging industry’s work is performed for the Corps of Engineers. Under these circumstances, where new entries to the business are rare, and where the contractors are well known to the agency, a responsibility determination under FAR ¶ 9.104 should suffice.”

In another important ruling the Court stated that it “does not regard a Corps of Engineers 'ombudsman' procedure included in the solicitation as a viable substitute for the judicial or administrative bid protest review that currently exists for sealed bidding.”  Under the “ombudsman” procedure, the review is confined to the Corps of Engineers, at either the Contracting Officer or the ombudsman level, and that is not the same as judicial review or review by the GAO.

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