Federal Construction Contracting Blog : Federal Construction Contracting Law Firm : Cohen Seglias Pallas Greenhall & Furman PC : Construction Law, Dredging and Claims

By: Edward T. DeLisle & Robert Ruggieri

Last week the U.S. Supreme Court announced that it will review an important Circuit Court case, which focuses on the enforceability of forum selection clauses.  These contract clauses identify where parties must litigate claims in the event of a dispute.  Contractors, especially federal contractors who perform work for the Government across the country and throughout the world, should, and most often do, include these clauses in their subcontract agreements. 

Forum selection clauses can give a prime contractor a “home court” advantage if litigation should become necessary.  Contractors, when forced to litigate, generally prefer to litigate where they are primarily situated for a variety of reasons, almost all of which pertain to cost.  By litigating in a court near its home base, a prime contractor can likely save on travel costs for key personnel, have its case tried in a court familiar to its legal counsel and make an adversary come to it, escalating the costs incurred for that company.  It’s a huge advantage.  Further, for companies that conduct business over a broad geographic area, forum selection clauses provide more certainty.  It allows them to anticipate costs better by avoiding litigation in multiple venues.      

As evidenced by a recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, forum selection clauses may not always be as iron-clad as they appear, and in some circumstances, may be ignored entirely.  In In re: Atlantic Marine Construction Company, Inc., despite clear language in a subcontract that identified a specific federal court in Virginia to resolve disputes, the Fifth Circuit ruled that a plaintiff subcontractor could file suit in Texas, where the project and witnesses are located, as the forum selection clause represented but one factor to consider when determining whether the contractually specified forum could be enforced.  This decision follows decisions in several other Circuit Courts, but remains the minority position among the Circuits.  The majority of the U.S. Circuit Courts will enforce forum selection clauses, unless there is fraud or the chosen forum is unreasonable.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s review of the Atlantic Marine decision will likely resolve the current split among the Circuits.

The Fifth Circuit did, however, suggest ways in which a contractor could draft a forum selection clause to improve its likelihood of being enforced, including identifying only specific state courts or arbitration tribunals, as opposed to federal courts, as appropriate forums.  The wisdom of the Fifth Circuit’s decision will be scrutinized by the Supreme Court, which will hopefully provide some clarity to this increasingly cloudy issue.   

As you can imagine, forum selection clauses, and the ability to enforce them, have important legal and business consequences.  Contractors that have a national and/or international platform should include well thought-out and effective forum selection clauses in their subcontracts to give themselves the best chance of securing that home court advantage.  You should certainly consult with a legal professional on how best to achieve this result, especially considering Atlantic Marine.  We will keep you updated on this interesting and important case.

Edward T. DeLisle is a Partner in the firm and a member of the Federal Contracting Practice Group. Robert Ruggieri is a Senior Associate in the firm's Federal Practice Group. 

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By: Edward T. DeLisle

We are frequently asked whether attorneys fees are recoverable as part of the federal claims procedure. The answer is sometimes. A case just decided by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit assists in explaining when such a recovery is possible.

In Tip Top Construction v. Donahue, the United States Postal Service required a contractor to perform additional work to complete an air conditioning repair project in the Virgin Islands. While it approved a change order to perform the additional work, the contractor incurred other additional costs, including attorneys fees, to convince the USPS to accept its request for additional money. Those monies were submitted in the form of a claim and denied.

The U.S. Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals upheld the denial stating that the costs included in the claim "had nothing to do with the performance of the changed work or genuine contract administration." The Federal Circuit disagreed.

The Federal Circuit took the position that the monies included in the claim reasonably flowed from negotiations associated with the change order process. This conclusion was important, for the Federal Circuit framed the issue as follows: "If a contractor incurred the cost for the genuine purpose of materially furthering the negotiating process, such cost should normally be a contract administration cost allowable under FAR 31.205-33, even if negotiation eventually fails and a CDA claim is later submitted." Here, the facts revealed that the parties were, in fact, making attempts to negotiate an amicable resolution regarding price for a number of months prior to submission of the claim. Consultants and attorneys were used by the contractor to assist it in its presentation to the Postal Service. Because the evidence suggested that the contractor's underlying purpose was to resolve the dispute, the Federal Circuit held that these costs were recoverable.

Tip Top illustrates the fine line one must walk when it comes to the collection of attorneys fees. Certainly, once an actual claim is submitted by a contractor, there can be no expectation to collect fees from that point forward. The dispute has traveled too far down the road of dispute resolution. Prior to that point, however, if a contractor can prove that the costs incurred for counsel stemmed from a desire to negotiate an amicable resolution to a change order dispute, recovery of fees is possible.

Edward T. DeLisle is a Partner in the firm and a member of the Federal Contracting Practice Group.

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By: Edward T. DeLisle

If a government agency terminates a construction contractor for default, it cannot then sit on its hands. The agency must re-procure and complete that project within some reasonable amount of time. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of any subsequent claim for excess costs to reprocure and finish the work. That was one of the very important messages delivered by the Court of Federal Claims last month in M.E.S., Inc. and Traveler’s Casulty & Surety Company of America v. The United States.

In September of 1998, the United States Postal Service (USPS) retained MES to build a new postal facility for it at a cost of $3,954,000. Prior to completion of the work, the USPS terminated plaintiff for failure to timely perform. The contractor disputed the termination, taking the position that defective plans and specifications prevented timely performance. While the parties attempted to amicably resolve their differences, their efforts failed, requiring the USPS to reprocure. The termination was issued on June 2, 1999.

The USPS did not reprocure until April 26, 2004, almost five years later. When questioned about the reason why it took so long to reprocure, the Contracting Officer for the USPS merely stated that there was “no reason” for the delay. In the meantime, the costs of completion escalated due to site deterioration, changes in the applicable construction codes and postal department standards, as well as certain “betterments” that the USPS desired upon reflection five years later. While, as part of its excess cost calculation, the agency’s experts attempted to eliminate certain costs that could not have reasonably been assessed to the defaulted contractor, the Court determined that the undue delay in reprocurement eliminated the USPS’s ability to demand any excess costs. Those costs were initially identified as $803,909 and later adjusted to $727,707.

In her opinion, the judge specifically stated that “a claim for excess reprocurement costs must be dismissed where an agency unreasonably delayed reprocurement and if that delay resulted in higher costs or otherwise prejudiced the contractor.” All of these elements were present in MES. Moreover, the USPS made no attempt to explain the basis for the delay, or rebut evidence provided by the contractor that the delay was unreasonable. For these reasons, the court threw out the government’s claim.

If anyone is interested in how not to properly terminate and then complete a project, I encourage you to read this opinion. As the court made a number of interesting rulings, stay tuned for more on MES.

Edward T. DeLisle is a Partner in the firm and a member of the Federal Contracting Practice Group.

 

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By: Edward T. DeLisle & Maria L. Panichelli

Many contractors know that there is a six-year statute of limitations on claims brought under the Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”) and Section 33.206 of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”). However, most contractors incorrectly assume that for claims pertaining to delay, or acceleration, the six-year statutory period begins to run only upon project completion or at some point in close proximity to completion, when the contractor is able to more accurately quantify its loss. This assumption is incorrect and can have severe consequences: once the limitations period expires, a claim is forever waived. As such, it is critically important to accurately assess the time at which the six year limitations period begins to run.

Pursuant to the CDA and the FAR, a claim must be submitted to the Contracting Officer within six years of the date upon which that claim “accrues.” Accrual occurs when all events that fix liability are known, or should be known, by the contractor. For liability to be fixed, an injury, or some type of impact or harm, must have occurred. However, monetary damages need not have been incurred, or do not have to be known, for accrual of a claim to take place (See FAR § 33.201). As such, events that result in delay, or acceleration, are likely to occur well before project completion, especially on large, complex projects and, even though the extent of the harm may not be known at that time, a “claim” has been born. To most contractors, this is rather counterintuitive -- it seems almost nonsensical to require a contractor to pursue, or even certify, a claim before a project is complete and the full range of excess costs are known. While this might be true, courts and agency review boards regularly rule against contractors who wait too long to assert a claim and attempt to make such an argument. (E.g. In Re Robinson Quality Constructors, ASBCA No. 55784, 09-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 34048 (Jan. 6, 2009)).

Contractors have attempted to argue that the six-year limitations period should be “equitably tolled” based on government misconduct. Equitable tolling essentially means that the limitations period stops running based upon issues of fairness. Historically, these arguments have been premised on the notion that the clock should stop ticking if a litigant can establish: (1) that he had been pursing his rights diligently; and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way that was not his fault. (E.g. Arctic Slope Native Association, Ltd. v. Sebelius, 583 F.3d 785, 798 (Fed Cir. 2009); Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 2012 WL 192815 (D.D.C. 2012)). However, in a recent opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (the statutory provision defining the CDA’s limitations period) creates an absolute bar of any claim submitted beyond 6 years, if that claim is pursued in the United States Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”), thereby eliminating the equitable tolling argument in that forum. FloorPro, Inc. v. United States, 2012 WL 1948997 (May 31, 2012). While other opinions suggest that the CDA’s statute of limitations might, nonetheless, be subject to equitable tolling if the contractor’s claim is pursed before an agency or board of contract appeals (see, e.g. Arctic Slope, supra), the CFC is often viewed as a more favorable forum. Therefore, contractors should, if at all possible, avoid triggering the limitations bar, which would preclude adjudication of their claim before the CFC. This can only be accomplished if the contractor acts promptly and accurately determines when liability was “fixed.”

Accurately assessing when a party’s liability becomes “fixed” in relation to a claim can involve a complicated analysis, and is very fact specific. Accordingly, contractors should track any increased costs as they are incurred, and seek professional advice as soon as it appears that there is a basis for a claim, regardless of when the project may attain completion.

Edward T. DeLisle is a Partner in the firm and a member of the Federal Contracting Practice Group. Maria L. Panichelli is an Associate in the firm’s Federal Practice Group.

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By: Edward T. DeLisle

As part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (the 2008 Act), Congress provided the General Accounting Office (GAO) with the authority to hear protests involving certain task and delivery order contracts emanating from both defense and civilian agencies. At the time, this authority was limited to a period of three years, meaning that it was set to expire later this year. A few months ago, President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011 (the 2011 Act). As part of that Act, Congress partially extended the GAO’s authority. It permitted the GAO to continue hearing task and delivery order protests for contracts in excess of $10 million, but only for those contracts issued by Department of Defense agencies. For a reason not readily apparent, Congress failed to extend the GAO’s authority over civilian agencies. A bill has emerged in the Senate to address this omission.

As reported by Law360, Senate Bill 498, entitled the “Independent Task and Delivery Order Review Extension Act of 2011,” was recently introduced by Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Joseph Lieberman, I-Conn. If passed, it would extend the GAO’s jurisdiction over task and delivery order protests relating to civilian agencies for an additional five and a half years, equaling the extension provided on DOD protests under the 2011 Act. This is an important development for government contractors. Many questions arose following passage of the 2011 Act. Why would Congress only extend the GAO’s authority over task and delivery orders on DOD work? It is possible that this was simply an oversight, though no one is quite sure. The legislative history is devoid of any discussion on the issue. Whatever the reason, if passed, S. 498 would maintain the status quo for five more years. We will continue to track this bill and report on its progress.

Edward T. DeLisle is a Partner in the firm and a member of the Federal Contracting Practice Group.

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By: Michael H. Payne and Craig A. Schroeder

Acceleration is defined as a directive to increase efforts in order to complete performance on time, despite excusable delay.  If the government does not agree that the contractor is entitled to acceleration costs, a contractor must file a request for an equitable adjustment (“REA”), or a claim under the Contract Disputes Act.  Although different formulations have been used in setting forth the elements of constructive acceleration, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has generally described the requirements to include the following elements, each of which must be proved by the contractor: (1) that the contractor encountered a delay that is excusable under the contract; (2) that the contractor made a timely and sufficient request for an extension of the contract schedule; (3) that the government denied the contractor's request for an extension or failed to act on it within a reasonable time; (4) that the government insisted on completion of the contract within a period shorter than the period to which the contractor would be entitled by taking into account the period of excusable delay, after which the contractor notified the government that it regarded the alleged order to accelerate as a constructive change in the contract; and (5) that the contractor was required to expend extra resources to compensate for the lost time and remain on schedule.  It is important to note that the contractor must prove that the costs claimed were actually incurred as a result of actions specifically taken to accelerate performance.

A contractor may accelerate on his own initiative to assure completion within the contract schedule or for other purposes. A contractor is, in fact, entitled to finish ahead of schedule, so long as he does not "tread upon the interests of others, or violate his contract."  The contractor cannot compel the Government to aid him in finishing ahead of schedule, however, or to recover the costs of acceleration unless the Government has actually or constructively ordered the effort. No compensation is due where a contractor voluntarily accelerates performance for his own purposes.

Michael H. Payne is the Chairman of the firm's Federal Practice Group and may be contacted to discuss constructive acceleration or federal construction matters generally. Craig A. Schroeder is an Associate in the firm’s Federal Practice Group.

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We recently reported (see our earlier blog article) the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims in BLR Group of America, Inc. v. United States, issued on November 25, 2008, in which the Court opened the door to contractor challenges of unfair or incorrect performance evaluations.  Coming literally on the heels of the BLR case, the Court issued another decision on December 9, 2008, Todd Construction Co., Inc. v. United States, denying a government motion to dismiss and holding that the Court had the jurisdiction to consider a challenge to a contracting officer’s decision regarding a contractor’s performance evaluation.  The Court held that Todd had submitted a “claim” within the meaning of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 because, on March 22, 2006, the Government issued its proposed final evaluations of Todd’s work, and on April 20, 2006, Todd submitted its comments protesting those evaluations.  The Government issued final evaluations on July 21, 2006, and Todd submitted both a claim and a supplemental claim to the Department of the Army, asserting regulatory violations in the preparation of the evaluations and lack of factual accuracy. On April 25, 2007, the contracting officer wrote to Todd, indicating the letter “serves as my final decision regarding your performance on the above Task Order” with a subject line “Final Contracting Officer Decision.”  Based upon these facts, the Court held that “this is a final decision of the contracting officer upon a written demand.”

In 2003, Todd Construction received two task orders from the United States Army Corps of engineers (“Corps”) for roof repair of buildings at the Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in North Carolina, and the work was completed in September of 2005. On March 26, 2006, the Corps issued proposed final evaluations rating Todd’s overall performance on the work as unsatisfactory.  Todd submitted comments to the contracting officer explaining why, in its view, those ratings were unmerited, but the contracting officer nonetheless issued final unfavorable evaluations on July 23, 2006.  In August of 2006, Todd appealed the contracting officer’s decision to Ms. Rita Miles of the Department of the Army, alleging that the Government (1) violated the applicable performance review procedures set forth in Army Corps of Engineers Regulation 415-1-17 and (2) arbitrarily issued evaluations unsupported by the facts.  Ms. Miles apparently provided some documents to a vice-president of Todd, and Todd responded to that communication on October 2, 2006.  Ms. Miles rejected Todd’s appeal on April 25, 2007.  The negative evaluations were then made part of the Construction Contractor Appraisal Support System (“CCASS”).

The government’s motion to dismiss contented that the Court lacked jurisdiction because Todd’s challenge to the accuracy and procedural propriety of performance evaluations was not a “claim” within the meaning of the Contract Disputes Act because it is not made “as a matter of right” and does not arise from or relate to the contract. Specifically, the government contended that [w]here, as here, the contractor’s claim is that the Government breached its internal policies, rather than the provisions of the contract, such a claim cannot properly be considered a claim ‘relating to the contract.’” The Court disagreed and concluded that “this is a ‘final decision’ of the contracting officer upon a ‘written demand,’ and the Court further concluded that Todd made that written demand ‘as a matter of right.’” 

The Court further stated that Federal regulations require that for construction contracts the “contracting activity shall evaluate contractor performance and prepare a performance report” “in accordance with agency procedures,” and that the report must be “reviewed to ensure that it is accurate and fair.” FAR 36.201.  The Corps has set forth detailed procedures to be followed in assessing contractor performance, with additional steps to be taken when the rating will be unfavorable.  Army Corps of Engineers Regulation 415-1-17(5)(c)(1).  In this case, Todd alleges that those procedures were not followed and that the evaluations it received were not, in fact, accurate and fair.  To the extent plaintiff asserts that when the Government prepares a performance evaluation that will be made part of the record upon which its future submissions will be judged, it is entitled to an accurate and fair performance evaluation prepared in accordance with the regulations, it makes that request “as a matter of right.” Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. United States, 178 F.3d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (observing that the “claim must be a demand for something due or believed to be due rather than, for example, a cost proposal for work the government later decides it would like performed”); BLR Group of Am. v. United States, No. 07-579C, at 10 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 25, 2008).

While the Court has scheduled further briefing by the parties as to what should be the appropriate remedy, the decision comes as yet another welcome advance in the willingness of the Court to look into the fairness of contractor performance evaluations. In the past, government agencies have acted with impunity and have leveraged their power to issue poor performance ratings in order to extract concessions from contractors during performance. There is no question, moreover, that the power to reduce a performance rating has had a chilling effect on the filing of claims – a right that is granted by law and regulation. The Court further noted that “the creation of mandatory performance reviews, databases archiving those reviews, and the requirement to consider those archived materials in future contract awards means that a negative review is potentially devastating to a contractor, who may have no opportunity—or very little opportunity—to mitigate the impact that review will have on future awards.”  Accordingly, “there are sound reasons, as Judge Sweeney recently explained, to address performance evaluations as issues of contract performance rather than as part of a bid protest when the contractor seeks future government contracts.”  See BLR Group of Am. v. United States, No. 07-579C, at 17 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 25, 2008).

The BLR and the Todd cases make it clear that contractors do not have the right to simply challenge a performance evaluation by filing an appeal directly to the Court. There must first be a “claim” that is submitted to the contracting officer challenging the decision and explaining why the contractor believes that the performance rating should be changed. If the contracting officer then issues a decision denying the “claim,” or if the contracting officer fails or refuses to respond within a reasonable time, the contractor may then appeal the contracting officer’s decision to the Court of Federal Claims. (The jurisdiction of the boards of contract appeals is not as broad as the Court’s and the boards have not been as receptive to contractor challenges to performance evaluations). Because this is an evolving area of the law, however, and because there are procedural hurdles that must be overcome, it is strongly suggested that contractors seek legal counsel before undertaking an appeal of this nature.

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In a decision earlier this month, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals reiterated that the recovery of unabsorbed home office overhead, based on the Eichleay formula, is for "a stand-by of an uncertain duration." The Board held that where a contractor is entitled to a compensable contract time extension for additional work, the contractor is entitled to recover extended home office overhead.  Extended home office overhead is calculated as a fixed percentage markup of costs incurred during the contract time extension. Fru-Con construction Corporation, ASBCA No. 55197, 55248, October 4, 2007. For a discussion on the Eichleay formula and the recovery of unabsorbed home office overhead, see our earlier article.

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On December 1, 2006, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective and made something that had already been established by court decisions very clear – that virtually every kind of electronically stored information (“ESI”) is discoverable in litigation.  Government construction contractors, and their attorneys, need to be concerned about the preservation and disclosure of electronic information, including e-mail messages, voicemail messages, and any kind of a file stored on a computer.  Unfortunately, as the information age makes an exponentially greater volume of information available, the seemingly easy storage of that information may actually be creating a vast minefield for the unwary.

Contractors need to be aware that even computer files that have been intentionally or inadvertently deleted are potentially discoverable.  (Simply because data has been “deleted” from a hard drive does not necessarily mean that it cannot be retrieved).  Courts may no longer accept the excuse that “the files were erased” if there was an obligation to preserve the data, or if the company failed to have an established ESI retention policy to assure the reasonable retention of electronic information.  The new rules provide guidance and clarification on a number of topics related to electronic discovery (e-discovery), including the discoverability of data that is difficult to access, such as back-up tapes, the form in which electronically stored information should be produced, and how to deal with the inadvertent production of privileged information when large amounts of electronic data are produced.

One of the difficulties with the production of electronic data is that it is often harder to review than paper documentation because it involves the examination of large amounts of data stored on CDs, DVDs, floppy disks, hard drives, backup tapes, network servers, Internet backup services, and other storage devices.  A company often finds it to be an overwhelming task to gather the data, and an equally daunting and costly task to electronically produce it.  Electronic information on a complex matter involving technical data can occupy hundreds or even thousands of CDs (we are currently involved in exactly such a case). 

It is important to recognize that the content of electronic information can be very different, and far less formal, than paper documentation.  We have noticed that there is often a tendency to be careless when writing an e-mail message because of the informality, as compared to a letter.  Contractor personnel are frequently very candid in e-mail messages and they may make off-the-cuff remarks that give the other side “ammunition” to discredit the contractor’s position.   In addition, electronic information often contains “metadata” (underlying data that states when a document was created, modified, accessed, etc.).  Without realizing it, or intending to do so, an electronic file may provide much more information than the author or the company ever intended, or was required, to preserve and that information may be a goldmine for the other side in litigation.

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As we have mentioned previously, the growing use of multiple award task order contracts in federal construction contracting, as can be seen in much of the disaster recovery work in New Orleans, is limiting the competitive opportunities for small and mid-sized construction contractors.  Unless a contractor is the recipient of one of the major task order contract awards, there is no opportunity for a contractor to compete for upcoming individual task orders and the contractor is effectively precluded from competing for potentially millions of dollars of work to be awarded over a period of years. In the past, when there were more single award contracts, if a contractor lost out to a competitor, there was always another solicitation on the horizon.  If a contractor fails to become one of those selected to compete under a multiple award task order contract, there may be no, or very little, work “waiting in the wings.”

It follows that it is important to monitor the decisions of the GAO and the courts to see what is being done to protect the rights of contractors, and we will continue to do so.  In a newly issued GAO decision, Palmetto GBA, LLC, B-299154, December 19, 2006, the Comptroller General stated that according to the legislative history of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA), task and delivery-order contracts were intended to encourage the use of multiple-award, rather than single-award contracts, in order to promote an ongoing competitive environment in which each awardee would be fairly considered for each order issued.  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-712, at 178 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2607, 2608; S. Rep. No.103258, at 15-16 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2561, 2575-76. In this regard, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires agencies to provide all awardees “fair opportunity to be considered for each order exceeding $3,000 issued under multiple delivery-order contracts or multiple task-order contracts.”  FAR sect. 16.505(b)(1)(i).

An interesting aspect of the Palmetto case is that the GAO reiterated that a task or delivery order that precludes competition for future task or delivery orders for the duration of the contract performance period may constitute a “downselection.”  The GAO has recognized downselections in circumstances not only where all work under a contract will be foreclosed from future competition, but also where specific categories of work will be similarly foreclosed for the duration of the contract.  While the GAO did not find that “downselection” occurred in the Palmetto case, it is important for contractors to recognize that a task order award that eliminates competition for future work can be successfully protested. Continue Reading...

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The cover story, “New Marching Orders,” in the most recent edition of Constructor, published by McGraw-Hill Construction, highlights a trend in military construction that should concern small to mid-size general contractors.  In the past, many projects for construction of military housing and other facilities were procured as individual contracts through sealed bid solicitations issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  Small and mid-size contractors, familiar with the local market conditions, were well positioned to compete for, win, and perform these contracts.  E. Michael Powers reports that today, however, the Corps is focusing its procurement efforts on multiple-award construction contracts and indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts with task orders.  These contracts tend to be for greater volumes of work, resulting in contracts that exceed the bonding capacity of many small to mid-size firms.

Powers also notes that a contract to build fifty buildings at a cost of $10 million per building, spread across a large geographic area, might not even appeal to firms that have the bonding capacity to bid on such a large contract.  In addition, where so much work is included in one contract, there is only one prime contractor, whereas before there could have been as many as fifty contractors performing fifty separate projects.

These large procurements are often the subject of negotiated procedures under FAR, Part 15, where price is no longer the controlling factor in determining who receives the contract.  In these "best value" procurements, the experience and past performance of a larger contractor may be decisive in the Corps' award decision.

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