Federal Construction Contracting Blog : Federal Construction Contracting Law Firm : Cohen Seglias Pallas Greenhall & Furman PC : Construction Law, Dredging and Claims

By: Lane F. Kelman

In making an award on initial proposals, is a tradeoff only between the two (2) highest-rated, highest-priced proposals appropriate?  The GAO, in a recent decision,Coastal Environments, Inc., B-401889, dated December 18, 2009, provides important clarification.  The decision beckons closer scrutiny of awards by unsuccessful offerors.

In Coastal Environments, Inc., the RFP identified six (6) evaluation factors in descending order of importance: (1) personnel and company qualifications, (2) management capability, (3) technical excellence, (4) past performance, (5) small business participation, and (6) price; the RFP also identified several subfactors under the non-price evaluation factors. Award was to be made to the responsible offeror whose proposal was determined to represent the “best value” to the government, all factors considered.

Eight proposals were received and evaluated using the adjectival rating system.  The contracting officer, as the Source Selection Authority (‘SSA”), reviewed the evaluation findings and performed a price/technical tradeoff between the two most highly rated proposals; those of Ecological Communications Corporation (“ECC”) and another Offeror.  Those two proposals were also the highest priced proposals. The Source Selection Authority (“SSA”) ultimately selected ECC for award after concluding that “due to the highly specialized nature of the work…ECC’s technical superiority” justified paying an additional $2,984 to ECC.

Coastal, who was not part of the tradeoff process, filed a protest and alleged, among other issues, that the tradeoff process should not have been restricted to ECC and the other most highly rated offeror. Coastal’s proposal, while not as highly rated, was $17,434.44 lower in price than GCC’s proposal.  The GAO held that the SSA impermissibly limited the price/technical tradeoff analysis to a comparison of the two highest-rated, highest-priced proposals.  The SSA failed to conduct any qualitative assessment of the technical differences between the two (2) highest-rated, highest-priced proposals and any of the other technically acceptable proposals to determine whether either of these proposals contained features that would justify the payment of a price premium.

The GAO found that the two higher-rated, higher-priced proposals considered in the tradeoff both received overall adjectival ratings of “Good” and “Low Risk,” while Coastal’s proposal received the next lowest rating of “Acceptable” and “Low Risk,” but was priced approximately 20 percent lower. The GAO concluded that a proper tradeoff decision must, per Federal Acquisition Regulation § 15.308, provide a rational explanation of why a proposal’s evaluated technical superiority warrants paying a premium.  Here, the SSA did not identify what benefits in ECC’s proposal warranted paying a premium to ECC when compared to Coastal’s lower-priced proposal, which was found to be acceptable and low risk.

Lane F. Kelman is a Partner in the firm and a member of the Federal Contracting Practice Group

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By: Lane F. Kelman

As opportunities in the private sector remain, at best, stagnant, the public sector has become increasingly competitive. The desire to gain a competitive advantage, however, must be tempered by compliance with ethical obligations. When attempting to gain a competitive advantage, it is crucial to avoid the appearance that your advantage is unfair. A recent decision by the GAO, Health Net Federal Services, LLC, highlights the balance that must be had when you seek a competitive advantage and the risk if the balance is not maintained.

On November 9, 2009, the GAO sustained the bid protest of Health Net Federal Services, LLC (HNFS) of the award of a contract to Aetna Government Health Plans, LLC (AGHP). HNFS and AGHP issued offers in response to request for proposals issued by the Department of Defense TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) for T-3 TRICARE managed health care support services. TRICARE is a managed health care program implemented by the Department of Defense (DOD) for active-duty and retired members of the uniformed services, their dependents, and survivors.
HNFS was the incumbent contractor. Its bid protest focused on a number of different issues, the most compelling challenge was that AGHP should be excluded from the competition based on an alleged unfair competitive advantage stemming from AGHP’s hiring of a former TMA employee (the TMA Chief of Staff) to prepare AGHP’s proposal.

In evaluating the possibility of an unfair advantage on behalf of AGHP, the GAO acknowledged that a guiding principle is the obligation of contracting agencies to avoid even the appearance of impropriety in government procurements. Where a firm may have gained an unfair competitive advantage through its hiring of a former government official, the firm can be disqualified from a competition based on the appearance of impropriety - even if no actual impropriety can be shown - if the determination of an unfair competitive advantage is based on facts and not mere innuendo or suspicion.

The GAO went on to conclude that the former TMA Chief of Staff that was hired by AGHP did, in fact, have access to non-public propriety information. As a result of the actual access to this information, a prima facie case was established that an appearance of impropriety existed. Importantly, the access to propriety information and appearance of impropriety did not, in and of themselves, require disqualification. Rather, AGHP, despite a recommendation from TMA's ethics advisor to disclose the Chief of Staff's involvement to the Contracting Officer ("CO"), failed to do so. Since the CO was not provided the opportunity to investigate the issues stemming from the use of a high-level former TMA employee in the preparation of its proposal, the appearance of impropriety was necessarily not assessed by the CO prior to the award and the protest was sustained.

The recent emphasis on ethics on government contracting requires contractors to avoid any conduct that even appears to be unethical. The case highlights the care that must be taken when contractors hire former government employees and involve them in the procurement process. If the employee was involved in the planning of the project or procurement while employed by the government, or if the employee had access to non-public information, a risk exists that the relationship will result in the disqualification of the proposal. Regardless, there should be full disclosure to the Contracting Officer before submitting a proposal.

Lane F. Kelman is a Partner in the firm and is a member of the firm’s Federal Contract Practice Group. He may be contacted for advice regarding federal construction contracting matters, including issues involving ethics in federal contracting. His e-mail address is lkelman@cohenseglias.com.

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Contractors continue to be concerned about the impact that the filing of protests or claims will have on their past performance evaluations in negotiated procurements.  While it is never a good idea to file a frivolous protest or claim, it is improper for procurement officials to downgrade past performance evaluations simply because a contractor has exercised a right afforded by law and regulation.  In fact, the Office of Management and Budget issued a Memorandum for Senior Procurement Executives on April 1, 2002, and stated that “. . . the filing of protests, the filing of claims, or the use of ADR, must not be considered by an agency in either past performance evaluations or source selection decisions.”  The Memorandum went on to provide that contractors may not be given “downgraded past performance evaluations for availing themselves of their rights by filing protests and claims or for deciding not to use ADR; and Contractors may not be given more positive past performance evaluations for refraining from filing protests and claims or for agreeing to use ADR.”

The Under Secretary of Defense endorsed the Memorandum and circulated it on December 16, 2002.  The cover letter stated that “We should continue to work with our contractors to avoid or minimize unnecessary protests and claims and encourage the use of ADR, where appropriate, while not discouraging contractors from availing themselves of the rights provided to them by law. The policy embodied in the Memorandum has not changed and contractors should challenge any past performance evaluation that is downgraded because of previous protests or claims.  It must be recognized, moreover, that the reason for a lower than expected evaluation may not always be revealed during a debriefing.  If a contractor suspects that an inappropriate downgrading has occurred, the only way to prove it may be to file a protest so that the agency’s Administrative Record may be reviewed by the protester’s attorney. (Note: In a negotiated procurement, the Administrative Record is almost always subject to a Protective Order that prohibits disclosure of the information to anyone other than the protester’s attorney).

Michael Payne is a Partner and is the Chairman of the firm's Federal Practice Group.
 

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In recent years, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has attempted to employ "innovative" contracting methods but, in doing so, has often limited the number of contractors who have had the opportunity to perform major construction projects.  One of the justifications for these “innovative” methods has been that there will be a reduction in the administrative workload resulting in a "savings" for the government.  As a result, it seemed as though fewer solicitations were being issued using the sealed bidding procedures in FAR Part 14, with a corresponding increase in the procurement of construction under FAR Part 15, Contracting by Negotiation.  Construction contractors began to find that competition was no longer based on price alone, but on subjective factors as well, such as past performance, technical ability, or client satisfaction.  Of course, even though these procurements were purportedly “negotiated,” the instances where discussions or negotiations actually occurred were relatively few in number.  It was for that reason that we continued to wonder whether the Corps ever actually intended to “negotiate” a negotiated contract.  Could the reason possibly be that the Corps wants to be able to use subjective evaluation factors, under the guise of “best value,” as an excuse not to award construction contracts to responsible, bonded, contractors who offer the lowest price?

In a further extension of the use of "Contracting by Negotiation," the Corps has also adopted the Multiple Award Task Order Contracting (“MATOC”) procedures provided under FAR Part 16.5, "Indefinite-Delivery Contracts," to the procurement of major construction projects.  We have been involved in on-going legal challenges to the use of MATOC for construction  because we believe that the preference for sealed bidding in construction, as expressed in FAR Part 36, is being ignored by the Corps.  Through the use of MATOC, the Corps has found a way to limit the competition for the design and construction of facilities in entire regions of the country to only a few of the very largest construction companies.
 
Just as the shift to large, regional MATOCs has decreased the number of contractors, both large and small, who are able to perform these projects as prime contractors, the adoption of design-build as the favored mechanism for major construction projects has also tended to limit competition.  Design-build contracting has permitted the government to shift more and more risk and responsibility to the contracting community, but it seems to be a community that is shrinking in size.  Does this make any sense at a time when the country is suffering from rapidly increasing unemployment and the government is planning to spend billions of dollars on improving the infrastructure?  There are many small and medium-sized business concerns who have capably performed thousands of federal construction projects over the years under sealed bidding.  We continue to wonder why that successful system is being systematically abandoned.

Now the Corps is beginning to issue solicitations for major construction projects under the provisions of FAR Part 16.403, Fixed Price Incentive Contracts, using a project delivery method referred to as "Early Contractor Involvement," or “ECI” for short.  Under ECI, the Corps engages the services of a general contractor to provide "preconstruction services" concurrent with the design of a project that is being performed by a design firm.  The construction contractor reviews the partially completed design for constructability and biddability.  As the design work nears completion, construction is then procured through the exercise of an option under the ECI contract.  An ECI procurement requires the construction contractor to compete on both technical and price factors long before the project's design is developed to the point that facilitates meaningful and well-informed cost proposals, however.  With so little detailed information on the construction that is being procured, the competition among construction firms has the real possibility of being nothing more than a popularity contest in which the government procurement officials make choices based on who they think they want to work with, rather than the contractor they should be working with based on the technical aspects of a particular project.  The competitors also must provide a ceiling price for the project as part of their proposals, long before the design has reached the point where a price estimate is anything more than an educated guess.  Although a Corps spokesman, in an article published in Engineering News-Record, indicated that the Corps is turning to ECI for classic reasons, that it is "better, faster, cheaper,"  we wonder what the basis is for such a bold conclusion.

In a recent press release, the New Orleans District of the Corps reported that it will use Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) to construct the $500 Million Gulf Intracoastal Waterway West Closure Complex project.  Colonel Alvin Lee, New Orleans District Commander, indicated that although "the New Orleans District has never used ECI as an acquisition strategy before," the District was "excited about the benefits it brings to this momentous project.”  In addition to the West Closure Complex project, the New Orleans District is proposing to employ ECI on a series of levee improvement projects on the Chalmette Loop Levee in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana.  These additional ECI contracts will total between $850 Million and $1.75 Billion.

Other Corps districts have had some experience using a similar method of procurement under a strategy known as "IDBB," or "Integrated-Design-Bid-Build."  Two of these IDBB projects are the new Community Hospital and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency Complex at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.  Very recently, other Corps districts have advertised the intention to issue ECI solicitations, notably for the construction of a Replacement Hospital at Fort Riley, Kansas ($250 to $500 Million).  Other Federal agencies can be expected to increasingly employ the ECI procurement method; the U.S. Navy already intends to construct a $68 Million Helicopter Maintenance Hanger in San Diego using ECI.  In private construction, ECI is called Construction Management (or Manager) at-risk, "CM@R."   A joint committee of the AIA and AGC have described CM@R as follows:

Construction management at risk (CM@R) approaches involve a construction manager who takes on the risk of building a project. The architect is hired under a separate contract. The construction manager oversees project management and building technology issues, in which a construction manager typically has particular background and expertise. Such management services may include advice on the time and cost consequences of design and construction decisions, scheduling, cost control, coordination of construction contract negotiations and awards, timely purchasing of critical materials and long-lead-time items, and coordination of construction activities.  In CM@R the construction entity, after providing preconstruction services during the design phase, takes on the financial obligation for construction under a specified cost agreement. The construction manager frequently provides a guaranteed maximum price (GMP). CM@R is sometimes referred to as CM/GC because the construction entity becomes a general contractor (GC) through the at-risk agreement. Primer on Project Delivery, AIA/AGC (2004).

A question remains as to whether the government can exercise the flexibility that a private entity can employ to insure that the ECI, or CM@R, process can be successful.  Whether or not such flexibility is possible, use of ECI will certainly further diminish the competitive nature of the government procurement of construction projects in the future.

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As the government has expanded its uses of Contracting by Negotiation through the issuance of RFPs ("Requests for Proposals"), as opposed to Sealed Bidding and the issuance of IFBs ("Invitations for Bid"), contractors have had to adapt to this new way of doing business.  All too often, a perfectly capable contractor is not selected for award, even though its price was the lower than its competitors, because it failed to adequately address the evaluation factors listed in the solicitation.  A recent decision by the GAO in the Matter of Capitol Drywall Supply, Inc. ("CDS"), decided on January 12, 2009, highlights the difficulty that a contractor faces when the agency and the GAO conclude that a proposal misses the mark.

The proposal by CDS was one of six submitted to the Corps of Engineers, and was the second lowest in price.  The problem, however, was that CDS was rated as the lowest on the technical merit evaluation factor due, primarily, to a lack of detailed information describing the firm's proposed procedures to perform the statement of work requirements, as well as a failure to demonstrate experience performing contracts similar in size, scope, and complexity, and which were valued at $1 million or more.  Finding that the lowest-priced and third lowest-priced proposals, which received significantly higher technical ratings than the CDS' proposal, represented the best value to the agency, awards were made to those firms; with respect to the latter award, the agency concluded in a price/technical tradeoff determination that the higher technical merit of the higher-priced proposal warranted the payment of the price premium associated with it.

Specifically, the agency evaluators found that while the firm's proposal provided a brief response to the detailed technical approach requirements, in which CDS mentioned the firm's intention to maintain inventory and warehouse operations, specific statement of work requirements were not referenced, as was required (e.g., regarding subcontractor relationships, safety and health plans, quality control, and planned communication and information management), and no planned procedures or detailed methodologies were provided to explain how the firm intended to perform the statement of work requirements. Similarly, under the delivery evaluation factor, while the CDS proposal mentioned the use of certain vehicles and noted that certain reports could be produced, the evaluators found that insufficient detail was provided to ensure an adequate number and type of vehicles would be readily available for simultaneous deliveries, as required, and no detailed methodology was presented to either explain what procedures would be followed to ensure that materials would be expeditiously obtained and delivered, including delivery to remote locations, or to explain in any meaningful detail the firm's planned procedures to meet stated reporting requirements.

In reiterating its position when a protester has failed to adequately respond to the requirements of a solicitation, the GAO stated that "In reviewing protests of alleged improper evaluations and source selections, our Office examines the record to determine whether the agency's judgment was reasonable and in accord with the solicitation's stated evaluation criteria and applicable procurement laws. See Abt Assocs. Inc., B-237060.2, Feb. 26, 1990, 90-1 CPD para. 223 at 4. It is an offeror's responsibility to submit an adequately written proposal that establishes its capability and the merits of its proposed technical approach in accordance with the evaluation terms of the solicitation. See Verizon Fed., Inc., B-293527, Mar. 26, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 186 at 4. A protester's mere disagreement with the evaluation provides no basis to question the reasonableness of the evaluators' judgments. See Citywide Managing Servs. of Port Washington, Inc., B-281287.12, B-281287.13, Nov. 15, 2000, 2001 CPD para. 6 at 10-11. Further, where, as here, technical factors are to be given greater importance than price in the determination of which proposal offers the agency the best overall value, price/technical tradeoffs may be made, and we will not disturb awards to offerors whose proposals have higher technical ratings and higher prices so long as the result is consistent with the evaluation factors and the agency has reasonably determined that the technical superiority outweighs the price difference. See Structural Preservation Sys., Inc., B-285085, July 14, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 131 at 7."

Author's Note:  The lesson to be learned from this case, and others like it, is that a contractor cannot take anything for granted when responding to an RFP.  It is a mistake to assume that the agency knows about your capabilities as a result of previous contracts, and it is similarly a mistake to assume that the government evaluators will learn about your capabilities even though you do not provide detailed information.  Every proposal stands on its own and it is important to prepare your proposal in a manner that provides information that is responsive to the evaluation factors.  Contractors need to make certain that every evaluation factor is addressed clearly and thoroughly.  It is no longer enough to be the best contractor, you now need to be the "best" at putting proposals together, as well.  Most assuredly, you should do everything possible to avoid a conclusion like the one the GAO reached in the CDS case that "[g]iven the lack of detail in CDS's proposal under each technical evaluation factor, we have no basis to question the evaluation."

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A decision just published by the Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), Matter of Burchick Construction Co., mpany, involved a request for proposals issued by the Department of Veteran Affairs ("VA") for the construction of an ambulatory care center . After receiving five proposals and evaluating the technical evaluation factors, the VA conducted discussions with the offerors that only addressed their price proposals. The VA determined that the offeror providing the best value was Massaro Corporation at a firm fixed price of $38,530,000. Burchick Construction Company, whose price proposal of $36,686,000 was the lowest price offered, challenged the award of the contract to Massaro.

During the evaluation of technical proposals, the VA had determined that Burchick's proposal contained "weaknesses" in a number of factors, including past performance, identification of key personnel, and small business participation. Based on these perceived weaknesses, the VA scored Burchick with a total of 50.8 points out of a possible technical score of 100 points. The VA had given Massaro a score of 67.3 points. When the VA decided to discuss the price proposals, it also decided that it would not conduct discussions with the offerors with respect to the firms' technical proposals, because "none of the offerors could materially improve its technical proposal."

 

Burchick contended that the VA did not conduct meaningful discussions since the VA did not apprise Burchick of, or provide it with the opportunity to address, the significant evaluated weaknesses in its technical proposal. Burchick explained that it could have addressed each of the VA's concerns that resulted in the downgrading of its technical evaluation.

 

While the GAO conceded that agencies have considerable discretion in determining whether and how to conduct discussions in a negotiated procurement, it found that where discussions are conducted, an agency must identify deficiencies and significant weaknesses, at a minimum, in the proposals of each offeror in the competitive range. The GAO concluded that discussions must be meaningful, meaning that the discussions must be sufficiently detailed so as to lead an offeror into the areas of its proposal requiring amplification or revision.

 

The GAO found that the VA failed to conduct meaningful discussions with Burchick, and that there was a reasonable possibility that Burchick was prejudiced, given that it offered the lowest price and could have addressed the VA's concerns such that it may have been offering the "best value" to the government. The GAO sustained the protest and recommended that the VA conduct discussions with the offerors about the technical proposals, and make a new source selection decision.

The GAO also criticized the agency's reliance on a numerical comparison of the proposals to determine "best value." While not specifically challenged by Burchick, the GAO noted that a mechanical comparison of the technical and price point scores is not a valid substitution for the qualitative assessment of the technical differences or the benefits associated with a higher priced proposal. Point scores are merely guides, and the record must contain adequate documentation of the price/technical tradeoff to support an agency's judgment concerning the significance of the differences is reasonable and adequately justified in light of the evaluation scheme. 

 

It should be noted that the Federal Acquisition Regulation does address the extent of the discussions which are to be conducted with offerors in the competitive range. FAR 15.306(d)(3) provides that:

 

At a minimum, the contracting officer must, subject to paragraphs (d)(5) and (e) of this section and 15.307(a), indicate to, or discuss with, each offeror still being considered for award, deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and adverse past performance information to which the offeror has not yet had an opportunity to respond. The contracting officer also is encouraged to discuss other aspects of the offeror’s proposal that could, in the opinion of the contracting officer, be altered or explained to enhance materially the proposal’s potential for award. However, the contracting officer is not required to discuss every area where the proposal could be improved. The scope and extent of discussions are a matter of contracting officer judgment.

 

While it is not uncommon for the GAO to defer to the discretion afforded the agency in negotiated procurements, that deference, as demonstrated in the Burchick decision, is not absolute. In instances where, as here, the agency's actions are clearly not in accordance with the requirements of the FAR, seeking redress in a protest before the GAO can sometimes result in a favorable outcome.

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An important decision, Serco, Inc. v. United States was issued by the United States Court of Claims last week in a case involving a government-wide acquisition contract (“GWAC”) awarded by the General Services Administration (GSA) to provide technology products and services to the entire federal government.  Sixty-two offerors competed for a chance to perform task orders under this GWAC.  In ranking the technical proposals of these offerors, GSA teams assigned adjectival ratings to various subfactors and then converted them into whole numbers ( e.g., 3, 4, 5). Combining, averaging and weighting these figures, the agency ended up with technical scores that were carried out to three decimal points ( e.g., 3.817), and it made critical distinctions among the sixty-two offerors based upon the thousandths of a point.  Based upon these technical scores, twenty-eight contractors were designated by the agency as “presumptive awardees.”  GSA then purported to conduct price reasonableness and tradeoff analyses to take into account price-but, conspicuously, none of these comparisons resulted in any of the “presumptive awardees” being displaced by a lower-priced offeror.  Indeed, GSA ultimately made awards to offerors whose prices were 59th, 60th and 61st out of the sixty-two offers-prices that the agency claims were “fair and reasonable” despite being twice as high as the lowest winning offer, as much as thirty percent higher than the independent government cost estimate, and more than two standard deviations to the mean of the evaluated prices for all the offerors.

The so-called “Alliant” GWAC is to be administered by GSA pursuant to section 5112(e) of the Clinger-Cohen Act.  Alliant is designed to provide federal agencies with a broad range of information technology (IT) products and services, including computers, ancillary equipment, software, firmware and similar applications, network design, support services, and related resources such as telecommunication and security.  Alliant contemplates the multiple-award of indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (MA/IDIQ) contracts, with a ceiling of $50 billion, to be performed, on a task order basis, during a five-year base period and one, five-year option period.  Under the Alliant Solicitation No. TQ2006MCB0001 (the Solicitation), individual task orders could range as high as $1 billion in value; successful offerors, however, are guaranteed a minimum take of only $2,500.  Alliant offers a wide range of contract types, including fixed-price, cost reimbursement, labor-hour and time and material.

On September 26, 2007, Serco, Inc. (Serco) filed a complaint in this court challenging the award decisions and seeking a variety of injunctive relief.  Subsequently eight other unsuccessful offerors filed protests and were joined in the Serco protest. GSA issued the Solicitation on September 29, 2006. The Solicitation advised that GSA “contemplate[d making] approximately 25 to 30 awards ... but reserves the right to place fewer or more awards, depending upon the quality of the proposals received.” Those receiving awards under the Solicitation are eligible to perform task orders under the contract. The Solicitation indicated that “[a]ward will be made to responsible Offerors whose proposals are determined to provide the ‘best value’ to the Government.”

In a scholarly opinion, by Judge Francis M. Allegra, the Court concluded that GSA, “in attaching ”talismanic significance to technical calculations that suffer from false precision, made distinctions that, in their own right, likely were arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law, but certainly became so when the agency failed adequately to account for price and to make appropriate tradeoff decisions. Those compounding errors prejudiced the plaintiffs and oblige this court to set aside the awards in question and order appropriate injunctive relief.”  The Court did not agree that there was a rational basis to make distinctions between offerors on the basis of thousandths of a point. Judge Allegra ruled that “Precision of thought is not always reflected in the number of digits found to the right of a decimal point – indeed, as with other constructs, there can be, to paraphrase Holmes, a “kind of precision that obscures.”  Ultimately, Court ruled that the agency made award decisions that were “arbitrary, capricious and otherwise contrary to law.”

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The Corps of Engineers responded to the recent Order of the United States Court of Federal Claims dated November 1, 2007, granting a permanent injunction against the issuance of a MATOC solicitation for dredging, by taking four proposed task orders included in the MATOC solicitation and reissuing them as separate negotiated procurements.  (See the article posted on November 5, 2007).  The Plaintiff, Weeks Marine, Inc., filed a motion asking the Court to find that the Corps of Engineers had violated the November 1 Order.  Weeks argued that the injunction of the MATOC solicitation was based upon a finding that there was no legal or rational basis for the Corps to employ contracting by negotiation instead of sealed bidding.  The re-issuance of those same projects as individual RFPs violated the spirit, intent, and the letter of the Court’s Order.

Weeks requested that the Court amend its November 1, 2007 Order to make it clear that the projects addressed by the task orders could only be procured by sealed bidding.   Judge Thomas C. Wheeler of the United States Court of Federal Claims responded by issuing a new Order on November 16, 2007, stating that “. . . the Court must fashion a remedy to address an agency’s conduct that the Court regards as an ‘end run’ to a judicial order and injunction.”  The Court decided to allow one of the four projects to proceed as an RFP because it involved dredging of the entrance channel to the Naval Submarine Base at Kings Bay, Georgia, and was considered to be urgent. The other three RFPs were not allowed to proceed as RFPs, however, because the agency “did not provide any legal or factual justification to use negotiated procurement methods.”  The Court was also concerned about the Corps’ unilateral decision to attempt to circumvent the earlier injunction and stated that “the prudent approach would have been for Defendant to seek relief from the injunction to issue this solicitation, rather than for the agency to decide unilaterally that the injunction did not cover the proposed action.”

In the hearing that was conducted on November 15, 2007, the Judge reiterated that “if sealed bidding is not used for dredging contracts, you may as well read FAR Part 14 right out of the regulation. I mean, when else is it going to apply if not to dredging contracts?”  The decision is a welcome recognition by the Court that sealed bidding is still the preferred method for procuring federal construction contracting, and the decision will hopefully help to stem the continuing move by the Corps of Engineers to unnecessarily employ IDIQ, MATOC, and contracting by negotiation in more of its construction procurements.

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In a recent prebid protest presented by our firm, Payne Hackenbracht & Sullivan, the United States Court of Federal Claims considered the protest of Weeks Marine, Inc. v. The United States (“Weeks”) challenging the decision of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, South Atlantic Division (“SAD”), to solicit proposals for maintenance dredging and shore protection projects using negotiated indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (“IDIQ”) multiple-award task order contracts (“MATOC”).  The Court noted that the contemplated change to negotiated IDIQ task order contracting represented a significant departure from SAD’s prior practice of using sealed bidding, and further noted that the policy change had caused widespread industry criticism. 

As grounds for its protest, Weeks asserted that SAD’s proposed change to negotiated IDIQ/MATOC task order contracting was contrary to law, and was without any rational basis.  Weeks relied upon 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) and Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) ¶ 6.401(a), mandating that an agency shall use sealed bidding procedures when (1) time permits, (2) awards will be made solely based on price, (3) discussions are not necessary, and (4) the agency reasonably expects to receive more than one bid. Weeks contended that each of these four conditions was met for SAD’s dredging contracts, and that no legal basis existed to use negotiation procedures.

The Corps of Engineers argued in opposition that SAD’s proposed IDIQ task order contracting was lawful, that the agency had wide discretion in selecting an appropriate procurement method, and that SAD’s justification for the change was reasonable under current circumstances.  The Court disagreed and ruled that an agency’s discretion “does not empower an agency to employ a procurement method in violation of applicable law.”  The Court ruled that SAD had not pointed to any significant changes in its procurement environment that would warrant a change to IDIQ task order contracting.  The Acquisition Plan confirmed that SAD had “excelled in program execution” during the last two years and “the Court does not see any reasons or developments for moving away from the sealed bid process.  Without any analysis of the applicable statutes and regulations, and without citing any significant reasons or developments, the Court held that SAD would violate 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a), FAR ¶ 6.401(a), FAR ¶ 14.103-1(a), and FAR ¶ 36.103(a) by employing IDIQ task order contracting methods.“

This is an important judicial opinion that will hopefully cause government agencies to revisit decisions to utilize contracting by negotiation in either single procurements or IDIQ contracting.  When the sole justification for negotiated contracting boils down to nothing more than a desire to introduce unnecessary subjectivity into the source selection process, RFPs should not be used and sealed bidding should continue to be the preferred method.  In dredging, as in many other areas of construction contracting, sealed bidding has been a successful procurement method for many years.  It is a system that provides the greatest risk coupled with the greatest opportunity for reward and it is an integral part of the free enterprise system.

Of great concern to the Court was the fact that under SAD’s “new” procurement method approximately $2 billion in task order awards during the next five years would become virtually immune from any judicial or administrative bid protest review.  The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (“FASA”) provides that “[a] protest is not authorized in connection with the issuance of a task order or delivery order except for a protest on the ground that the order increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which the order is issued.”  While SAD’s current sealed bid awards routinely are subject to bid protest review by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) or the Court, SAD’s task order awards would be insulated from review except in very limited circumstances.  Thus, while purporting to use highly discretionary “best value” evaluation procedures in awarding task orders, SAD effectively would remove itself from any bid protest oversight.   Although the Corps argued that the Court must apply the FASA provision that Congress created, the Court ruled that this provision did not authorize SAD to convert all of its procurements into task orders.

In asserting a need for a change from sealed bidding to contracting by negotiation, the Corps contradicted its own position by stating that its sealed bid approach had “excelled in program execution” during the last two years.  As a result, the Court concluded that “The agency has provided no evidence that the current system is failing or in need of revision.  In fact, the Court would be hard-pressed to identify any contracts better suited to sealed bid procurement than dredging.  If not appropriate for dredging work, it is difficult to imagine when sealed bidding ought to be used.” (Emphasis added).

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In a decision issued on April 20, 2007, but published today because of a protective order, the GAO denied a protest by Olympus Building Services, Inc., B-296741.14; B-296741.15 against the award of a contract to Rowe Contracting Services, Inc., issued by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for janitorial services at the DIA Analysis Center. Olympus challenged the proposal evaluation and best value determination.

Among other things, Olympus asserted that Rowe’s proposal should not have been rated excellent under the technical factors because it did not include a required security awareness plan.  In this regard, in evaluating Rowe’s initial proposal, the Technical Evaluation Board (TEB) noted that Rowe had not provided a security awareness plan; the agency pointed this out to Rowe as a weakness during discussions.  In response, in its final proposal revision (FPR), Rowe provided a security awareness plan comprised of a short statement explaining, among other things, that Rowe was familiar with current Defense Security Services and DIA Regulations and security manuals, and stating that Rowe would comply with all DIA security policies. The FPR also included copies of several documents, including an Annual Security Awareness Briefing, a Refresher Security Briefing, and a Security Awareness Bulletin (self inspection handbook for contractors). The TEB determined that this information was sufficient to respond to its original concern.  Olympus argued that the information should not have been deemed sufficient because it did not include a narrative explaining how each of the included documents would be utilized during performance.

The GAO concluded that the RFP did not require that the security awareness plan be presented in any particular format or include any particular information; thus, the fact that the plan could have included additional information did not require the agency to find it deficient.  “The plan Rowe presented included information addressing security awareness and, given the absence from the RFP of detailed informational requirements, we think the agency reasonably could determine that this information was sufficient to address its concerns. Olympus’s disagreement with the agency’s conclusion is not sufficient to establish that the evaluation is unreasonable.”

While the outcome of the protest might have been the same for other reasons, we find it to be somewhat inconsistent, based on prior GAO decisions, for the GAO to take the position that instead of providing a security awareness plan, it was sufficient for Rowe to simply furnish a “short statement” explaining that it was familiar with DIA security policies.  A “plan” is usually required to enable a TEB to be certain that an offeror has thought out the implementation of agency policy.  The GAO has frequently found that the mere recitation of compliance with an RFP requirement is not sufficient to demonstrate compliance.  The fact that the TEB was willing to accept a “short statement” instead of a security awareness plan should not have endorsed by the GAO.

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In a decision issued by the Government Accountability Office, S4, Inc., B-299817, August 23, 2007, the disappointed offer protested an award to Croop-LaFrance, Inc., a lower priced offeror, under a Request for Proposals (“RFP”) to procure information technology desktop information services. The RFP specified that award would be based on a “technically acceptable-risk/past performance/price tradeoff,” which the RFP explained as follows:

For those Offerors who are determined to be technically acceptable, tradeoffs will be made between proposal risk, past performance and price. Proposal risk and past performance are of equal importance, and when combined, are considered significantly more important than price.

The agency determined that the ratings of past performance of S4, Inc. and Croop-LaFrance were essentially equal and that it was therefore appropriate that price should be the discriminator in making the source selection.  S4 contended that the agency should have drawn more detailed distinctions in the past performance evaluations and that the agency improperly ignored significant distinctions. This sort of protest is very difficult to win because it calls upon the GAO to substitute its discretion for that of the agency – something that the GAO has consistently refused to do, except where there is no rational basis or the agency’s source selection, or procurements laws or regulations have been clearly violated.

Predictably, the GAO stated that “Determining the relative merits of an offeror’s past performance information is primarily a matter within the contracting agency’s discretion; we will examine an agency’s evaluation only to ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation’s evaluation criteria and procurement statutes and regulations.” Here, the RFP did not commit the Air Force to evaluating past performance only in the more selective manner that S4 desires.  Rather, based on the GAO’s review of the record, the finding was made that the Air Force’s approach was consistent with the RFP, and that the overall rating of Croop-LaFrance as “high confidence” under the past performance factor was reasonable.

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A client new to Federal contracting was requested recently to submit a "BAFO" by an agency contract specialist. Our client asked what was meant by a "BAFO," and the government representative responded "your best and final offer," and suggested that our client read the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). When our client could not find any reference to a "BAFO" or a "best and final offer" our "baffled" client called us. "Best and Final Offer," or "BAFO" was a term used in the FAR many years ago, before the major revision to Part 15, "Contracting by Negotiation," in 1997. In a negotiated procurement, following the conclusion of discussions with offerors, the contracting officer would issue a request for best and final offers to all offerors still within the competitive range. The pre-1997 FAR contained an entire section that described the "best and final" process. In Federal procurement today, “BAFO” has been replaced by "final proposal revision," as referenced in FAR 15.307. However, some agencies still refer to an “FPR” as a “BAFO.”

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A recent GAO decision highlights the need for offerors to fully understand a Request for Proposals (RFP) and to pay close attention to the details when preparing a proposal in response to an RFP.  In C. Martin Company, Inc., the agency rejected the protestor’s proposal, determining that it was technically unacceptable.  The agency discovered that the offeror had referenced outdated regulations, standards, and procedures.  Some of the references were to processes and standards that had been obsolete for at least three years.  It became evident that the offeror had incorporated parts of a prior RFP submission years before on a similar project.

The agency’s technical review team concluded that the proposal was deficient and that the offeror did not have a clear understanding of the RFP’s requirements.  The offeror was not given an opportunity to cure the deficiencies. After the offeror learned of the basis of its rejection during a debriefing, it filed a protest contending that the deficiencies in its proposal were minor and that it should have been given the opportunity to correct its proposal. Its main argument was that its proposal could easily have been corrected. 

The GAO, in denying the protest, stated that neither the ease of the corrective effort nor the “minor” nature of the deficiencies were determinative of whether the proposal should be accepted or rejected. Instead, the GAO held that the need for numerous revisions “evidenced an inherent lack of understanding or awareness of the current RFP’s requirements.”    The GAO succinctly stated in upholding the agency’s rejection of the proposal: “Offerors are responsible for submitting an adequately written proposal, and run the risk that their proposals will be evaluated unfavorably where they fail to do so.”

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The cover story, “New Marching Orders,” in the most recent edition of Constructor, published by McGraw-Hill Construction, highlights a trend in military construction that should concern small to mid-size general contractors.  In the past, many projects for construction of military housing and other facilities were procured as individual contracts through sealed bid solicitations issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  Small and mid-size contractors, familiar with the local market conditions, were well positioned to compete for, win, and perform these contracts.  E. Michael Powers reports that today, however, the Corps is focusing its procurement efforts on multiple-award construction contracts and indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts with task orders.  These contracts tend to be for greater volumes of work, resulting in contracts that exceed the bonding capacity of many small to mid-size firms.

Powers also notes that a contract to build fifty buildings at a cost of $10 million per building, spread across a large geographic area, might not even appeal to firms that have the bonding capacity to bid on such a large contract.  In addition, where so much work is included in one contract, there is only one prime contractor, whereas before there could have been as many as fifty contractors performing fifty separate projects.

These large procurements are often the subject of negotiated procedures under FAR, Part 15, where price is no longer the controlling factor in determining who receives the contract.  In these "best value" procurements, the experience and past performance of a larger contractor may be decisive in the Corps' award decision.

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In yet another example of one of my long-standing complaints about the GAO’s interpretation of the “Procurement by Negotiation” process specified in FAR, Part 15, the GAO has reiterated its long-standing policy that “there is generally no obligation that a contracting agency conduct discussions where the RFP specifically instructed offerors of the agency’s intent to award a contract on the basis of initial proposals without conducting discussions.   In a decision issued today, in the Matter of Gemmo-CCC, B-297447.2, December 13, 2006, the GAO ruled that a protest that the agency should have engaged in clarifications with the protester to resolve material omissions in its proposal must be denied since any such exchange would have constituted discussions, not clarifications, and an agency generally has no obligation to hold discussions where it put offerors on notice of its intent to make award on the basis of initial proposals.

The protester’s offer was not considered for award because the agency believed that important vendor data had been omitted from the proposal. The protester argued that since its price was substantially lower than the awardee’s price, the agency should have informed it if it believed that vendor product data had been omitted and should have allowed the protester to cure the alleged defect.  The GAO disagreed and stated that “contrary to the protester’s assertion that the agency was required to hold discussions before making award in light of the protester’s lower price, an agency is not precluded from awarding on the basis of initial proposals basis merely because an unacceptable lower-priced offer might be made acceptable through discussions.”  In other words, an agency has no obligation to negotiate a negotiated proposal, even if such negotiations (discussions) might result in an unacceptable low bid being made acceptable. From a taxpayers perspective, that policy does not make sense.

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“Discussions” in a negotiated procurement between the government and an offeror are the exception, not the norm, as those of you who have submitted a response to a Request for Proposals know.  Too often the government awards a contract on the basis of the initial proposal, without any discussions or negotiations with the offerors.  The reason that the government refrains from formally opening up negotiations is that if discussions occur between the government and one offeror, then the government must hold discussions with all of the offerors in the competitive range.  (FAR 15.306(d)(1).  That can be time consuming.  (It can be argued that the term “Procurement by Negotiation,” as explained in FAR, Part 15, anticipates that discussions and negotiations will actually occur). 

            Of course, not all communications between the government and an offeror constitute “discussions.”   As the Government Accountability Office stated in a recent case, Overlook Systems Technologies, Inc., Nov 28, 2006, “the acid test is whether an offeror has been afforded an opportunity to revise or modify its proposal.” In Overlook, the contracting officer contacted the successful offeror regarding a perceived organizational conflict of interest because Overlook planned to use a subcontractor that had provided a system to the government that Overlook would now “troubleshoot.”  The GAO determined that the contracting officer’s communications with Overlook were similar to the sort of inquiries the government frequently makes to perform a responsibility determination.  The GAO relied heavily on the fact that the government was required to make such a responsibility determination, citing prior GAO decisions that have held that responsibility inquiries are not “discussions.”

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This article describes a GAO decision that highlights how difficult it is to prevail on a protest that challenges an agency’s rating of a proposal where the protest is not supported by anything more than a difference of opinion as to how much weight, or what score, should be assigned to a particular evaluation factor. Absent a showing that there was no rational basis for an agency’s evaluation, contractors should not expect the GAO to overturn an evaluation.

The GAO published a decision today that was originally issued on July 19, 2006, but delayed in being made public because of the need for redactions.  The case involved a protest by East-West Industries, Inc. against the award of a contract to Regent Manufacturing, Inc.   The solicitation was issued under request for proposals (RFP) No. FA8518-04-R-70801, advertised by the Department of the Air Force for multi-aircraft canopy cranes (MACC). East-West challenged the past performance and risk evaluations of its and Regent’s proposals. The protest was denied.

In its decision, East-West Industries, Inc. , B-297391.2; B-297391.3, the GAO stated that in reviewing a protest of an agency’s proposal evaluation, “our review is confined to determining whether the evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation and applicable statutes and regulations.” The GAO found that the evaluation of protester’s proposal under the past performance evaluation factor was unobjectionable where the agency reasonably concluded that only one of four prior contracts was of a magnitude and complexity essentially the same as the solicitation’s, and thus met the solicitation’s definition of very relevant. Since only one contract was rated very relevant and the protester received exceptional performance ratings under only two of its three relevant contracts, the GAO determined that the agency reasonably concluded that East-West’s performance record warranted assigning the firm a very good/significant confidence rating based on there being little doubt--rather than no doubt--as to its successful performance.

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The Navy recently awarded three cost-plus-award-fee, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) contracts to Fluor International, Inc., URS-IAP, LLC (a joint venture of URS Corporation and IAP Worldwide Services, Inc.) and Atlantic Contingency Constructors, LLC (a limited liability company managed by The Shaw Group) for global contingency construction. Each contract was for a base year with four one year options, and the value of each contract was approximately one billion dollars. The contractors were to provide construction and related engineering services in response to war fighting needs, global natural disasters, and humanitarian assistance.

The awards were made following a "best value" evaluation based on experience, past performance, contingency planning, management, small business utilization, and cost. Non-cost factors were considered more important than cost. A disappointed offeror, Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. (“KBR”), filed a GAO protest asserting that the Navy misevaluated the proposals under technical and cost factors. The GAO agreed and issued a decision sustaining the protest.

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A GAO decision released today, but dated November 15, 2006, reported that Advanced Federal Services Corp. protested the award of a contract to Eastek, Inc. under request for proposals (RFP) No. W9128Z-06-R-0001, issued by the Department of the Army Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command for business administrative support services (BASS).  The protester contended that the agency unreasonably evaluated offerors’ technical proposals and past performance and made an improper source selection decision.  The protest was denied.

The GAO stated that in reviewing a procuring agency’s evaluation of an offeror’s technical proposal, “our Office’s role is limited to ensuring that the evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation and applicable statutes and regulations. As with any evaluation review, our chief concern is whether the record supports the agency’s conclusions To the extent a protester disagrees with an agency’s evaluation, such mere disagreement does not render an evaluation unreasonable; our Office will not question an agency’s evaluation judgments absent evidence that its judgments were unreasonable or contrary to the stated evaluation criteria.”

In other words, contractors who want to challenge the government’s evaluation of an offer submitted in response to a Request for Proposals (RFP) should understand that the GAO gives great latitude to federal agencies. The GAO will almost always yield to the discretion of the source selection official unless the protester can provide evidence that there was not a rational basis for the evaluation.   See Advanced Federal Services Corp., B-298662, November 15, 2006.

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The GAO published a decision today in the Matter of SunEdison, LLC, B-298583; B-298583.2, dated October 30, 2006, involving SunEdison’s protest of an award to PowerLight Corporation under request for proposals (RFP) No. FA4861-06-R-B501, issued by the Department of the Air Force for the construction and operation of a photovoltaic array to supply solar power to Nellis Air Force Base (AFB) in Nevada. The protester contended that the agency’s evaluation of offerors’ prices was flawed and the GAO sustained the protest. 

The protester argued that the agency’s evaluation of the offerors’ prices was flawed in that it failed to take into consideration that PowerLight’s price was offered contingent upon “successful completion of an REC purchase agreement with Nevada Power,” whereas its own price was offered on an unconditional basis.  The GAO agreed that the agency’s price evaluation was flawed and found hat PowerLight’s inclusion of a contingency in its pricing rendered the proposal ineligible for award.  Where a solicitation requests offers on a fixed-price basis, an offer that is conditional and not firm cannot be considered for award.  Omega World Travel, Inc.; Sato/Travel, Inc., B-288861.5 et al., Aug. 21, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 149 at 6.  Here, not only did PowerLight make its offer conditional upon successful completion of an REC purchase agreement, but further, it acknowledged the uncertainty of such an agreement being reached.

Government contractors need to keep in mind, when responding to a sealed bid invitation or to a request for proposals, that conditional pricing is an almost certain way to have your bid, or offer, rejected.  Of course, this procurement seems to have been yet another of those all too frequent “negotiated” procurements were actual discussions, or negotiations, did not occur. The Contracting Officer simply furnished each of the offerors with “evaluation notices” describing required information that had not been fully addressed in the proposal or that required clarification.  Apparently the uncertainty in PowerLight’s proposal was not addressed, and there were no discussions during which additional issues could have been raised. (Unlike sealed bidding, where a bid cannot be revised after bid opening, offers submitted in response to a Request for Proposals can be revised after offers are submitted if the government conducts discussions, or negotiations, and gives the offerors in the competitive range an opportunity to submit best and final offers. The regulations regarding Contracting by Negotiation are found in FAR, Part 15).

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The GAO issued a decision today reiterating a familiar theme: Where a protester’s proposal failed to provide information specifically requested by the solicitation and necessary for evaluation purposes, the agency’s evaluation of the proposal as “poor” was reasonable.

The solicitation required the submission of a proposal with sections addressing the offeror’s past performance, technical approach, staffing, and management approach, and supplied instructions as to what proposals were to address in relation to each of the RFP’s evaluation factors. Because the agency’s evaluation was dependent upon information furnished in the proposal, it was the offeror’s obligation to submit an adequately written proposal for the agency to evaluate. The protester simply failed to do so. Therefore, the agency’s evaluation of the proposal, and determination to not award a contract under this solicitation to the protester, was consistent with the terms of the solicitation and was reasonably based. See Matter of Phyllis M. Chestang, B-298394.3, November 20, 2006.

All government contractors should be aware that federal agencies have a great deal of discretion in determining whether a proposal is responsive to the listed evaluation factors. Before submitting a proposal, contractors should try to put themselves in the position of the government’s source selection team. Does the proposal answer the questions that the government will have about an offeror’s experience, past performance, and technical qualifications? If your proposal doesn’t seem convincing and responsive to you, the chances are that the government will not think very much of it either. In the world of negotiated procurement and proposal preparation, it is vital to be thorough, responsive, and persuasive. A contractor needs to sell the company’s capabilities and approach throughout the process.

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